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[I]n any context, such a standard-the community's attitude-is usually
unknowable. It resembles a slithery shadow, since one can seldom learn,
at all accurately, what the community, or a majority, actually feels.l
INTRODUCTION
Blacks in central city neighborhoods are more likely than any other
group to perceive crime as a problem.2 They have the highest rates of
violent crimes victimization3 and they are seven times more likely to be
murdered than whites.4 Grim statistics like these, along with impassioned
1. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
2. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT:
PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, 1995 [hereinafter DOJ, PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD
CRIME].
3. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION
SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 1999, at 6, 9-11 (showing African Americans remain statistically
more likely to be victims of violent offenses even after controlling for income and other salient
demographic factors).
4. See JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAwITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA
BRIEF: HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1999). Another DOJ publication, Murder in
Large Urban Counties, 1988, shows that 94% of black murder victims in urban areas are killed by other
blacks. Violent crimes continue to be largely intraracial. For example, 84% of violent crimes against
blacks are committed by other blacks. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SELECTED FINDINGS: VIOLENT CRIMES 4 (1994).
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personal accounts of violent encounters and heroic daily efforts to avoid
such encounters, have led race and criminal law scholars, such as Randall
Kennedy, to express a seemingly natural though unconventional claim:
Frustrated and overwhelmed by gangs, drugs and crime, blacks in high-
crime neighborhoods welcome disproportionately tough criminal sanctions
and expanded police discretion.5 This claim, which I label the "urban
frustration argument," remains unconventional because African Americans
are broadly viewed to perceive law enforcement with suspicion and
distrust.6 This perception of distrust has been significantly bolstered by
recent reports of extreme police misconduct in major urban areas such as
Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City, and Philadelphia.
7 In New York
City, for example, community tension and distrust of police appear to be
rising as residents struggle to reconcile a recent string of police killings of
unarmed black men.8  These recent incidents notwithstanding, scholars
5. See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1994) (noting that the disparities in criminal enforcement in
the black community may be due to the "state apparatus responding sensibly to the desires ... of black
communities.., for protection against criminals preying upon them"). See also RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997) ; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 571 (1997);
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of
Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CI. LEGAL F. 197; Kate Stith, The Government Interest in Criminal Law:
Whose Interest Is It Anyway?, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 137, 153 (Stephen E.
Gottlieb ed., 1993. Cf. Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward
Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
137, 157 (1997) [hereinafter Meares, Lessons] (employing survey data to evaluate the proposition that
"groups that experience higher levels of criminal victimization should be more likely ... to support 'get
tough' approaches to crime" and finding this proposition unsupported among African Americans in her
sample). See also Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 (1995) (arguing that blacks do not support disparate enforcement).
6. For lists of surveys and empirical research supporting this view, see JULIAN V. ROBERTS &
LORETTA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 127-54 (1997); KATHERYN K.
RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 26-46 (1998); Butler, supra note 5; William J. Stuntz, Race Class, and
Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (1998).
7. A few recent incidents include the brutal assault on Abner Louima in a New York Police
Department precinct bathroom, the racial profiling scandal of the New Jersey State troopers, and the
extraordinary allegations of misconduct and criminal behavior in the Los Angeles Police Department's
anti-gang units and the NYPD's street crimes units. Consider, for example, the recent scandal
involving the LAPD's Rampart Division anti-gang unit. The scandal involving allegations of beatings,
unjustified shootings, lying under oath, manufacturing evidence and even drug dealing by officers in the
anti-gang unit-known as a CRASH unit (for Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums)-is still
unfolding. Thus far, fifteen officers already have been terminated and many more are under
investigation (though the LAPD's 362-page report on the scandal does not reveal the numbers). See
BERNARD C. PARKS, LAPD BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPART AREA CORRUPTION INCIDENT:
PUBLIC REPORT (Mar. 1, 2000). Additionally, Police Chief Bernard Parks abolished all of the city's
existing CRASH units. See Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 1, 2000, at 32,37.
8. The most publicized killing being the bullet-blazing shooting of unarmed Amadou Diallo and
the most recent being the killing of Patrick Dorsimond, a black security guard who was reportedly shot
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have, noted that the general sense of police distrust among African
Americans is giving way to "a demand ... for higher levels of law-
enforcement," 9 -a demand that is supported by a new sense of equity and
partnership achieved through growing minority political power in urban
areas and new problem-oriented law enforcement approaches. 10 These new
approaches promise to give high-crime urban communities greater
protection from criminal activity by vesting enforcement agencies with
increased discretion. Proponents of this approach contend that law-abiding
minorities in urban communities are willing to yield more discretionary
powers to law enforcement because "the continued victimization of
minorities at hands of criminals poses a much more significant threat to the
well-being of minorities than does the risk of arbitrary mistreatment at the
hands of the police."
11
The urban frustration argument, however, has been challenged on
several fronts, most notably for lacking empirical support. 2 There is no
broad-based evidence showing that African Americans in higher-crime
neighborhoods are willing to support increased police discretion and
harsher sanctions as the urban frustration argument maintains.13 In fact, a
in a struggle following his indignant refusal to buy drugs from a police officer in an undercover buy-
and-bust operation. Evidence of racially biased police encounters with black and Hispanic youth in
New York City has been recently reported by the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New
York. See ELIOT SPrrzER, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES 92-110 (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter "STOP AND FRISK"];
infra note 181 and accompanying text.
9. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153,1163 (1998).
10. For an elaboration on the community- and problem-oriented law enforcement perspectives
and policies, see Livingston, supra note 5.
11. Kahan & Meares, supra note 9, at 1166. "Indeed, the overwhelming support of inner-city
residents for the elements of the new community policing is strong evidence that these laws are liberty
enhancing on net." Id. at 1182.
12. See Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 215, 215-16; David
Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83
GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995); Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot
Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 195, 216
(Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong Than Rights,
BOSTON REv., Apr.-May 1999, at 13; Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of
Racial Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249 (1997).
13. Several recent reports, however, suggest that African American distrust of the criminal
justice system may not fully be shared by other minority groups. For example, a 1999 survey of citizen
confidence in the court system, conducted by the research arm of the National Association of State
Courts, showed that Hispanics expressed much more confidence in the courts than African Americans.
See David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What Public
Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 24, 26-27. Similarly, despite the recent
Rampart police scandal, "[t]he predominantly Latino community of Rampart has been supportive of the
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significant amount of survey data reveals little or no association between
citizen support for the police and fear of victimization. 14  With limited
confirming evidence, the urban frustration argument remains largely
anecdotal, for while urban minorities clearly seek protection from
criminals, they (largely the victims of police harassment and abuse) are also
wary of the police. 15  The tension between controlling crime and police
discretion is well expressed by one community member in the Bronx
neighborhood where Amadou Diallo was shot:
We're grateful for a lot of what the police have done to bring down
crime, and we realize most officers, like most residents of our
community, are honest, hard-working citizens .... [b]ut people are being
stopped for no reason, thrown against a fence and searched. Their cars
are stopped without probable cause.... What some of the officers are
doing is just creating an atmosphere of fear. 16
This Article presents results from survey data of perceptions
concerning the police and the legal system in order to make inferences
about the desire for differential and discretionary legal enforcement among
African Americans.17 Analysis of the data indicates, unsurprisingly, that
L.A.P.D." Cannon, supra note 7, at 62 (citing a 1997 poll by the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at
Loyola Marymount University, which reported that Latinos had the highest regard for the police among
all ethnic groups surveyed). Since the data used here are based on an African American sample, this
Article focuses solely on the views of African Americans. The generalizability of any claims or
observations to other minority groups is clearly a matter for debate.
14. This observation may be related to the finding that Americans generally have little
confidence in the ability of the police to protect them from crime. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra
note 6, at 129-30.
15. See Saundra Lee Browning, Francis T. Cullen, Liqun Cao, Renee Kopache & Thomas J.
Stevenson, Race and Getting Hassled by the Police, 17 POLICE STUD. 1, 8 (1994); Francis T. Cullen,
Liqun Cao, James Frank & Robert H. Langworthy, "Stop or I'll Shoot": Racial Differences in Support
for Police Use of Deadly Force, 39 AM. BEHAVIORAL. SCIENTIST 449 (1996) [hereinafter Cullen et al.,
"Stop"] (describing national poll data showing blacks as significantly more likely than whites to
perceive police brutality and use of excessive force in their communities).
16. David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1999, at Al (quoting Francisco Gonzalez, district manager of Community Board No. 9).
17. The principal data source is the 1993-94 National Black Politics Survey-a nationwide
survey of adult African Americans concerning their perceptions of politics, race, and religion. See
MICHAEL DAWSON, RONALD BROWN, & JAMES S. JACKSON, NATIONAL BLACK POLITICS STUDY, 1993
(Inter-university Consortium. for Political and Soc. Research No. 2018, Aug. 1998) [hereinafter NBPS].
For a useful summary of the data and sampling methodology in the survey, see MICHAEL C. DAWSON,
RIAz KHAN & JOHN BAUGHMAN, BLACK DISCONTENT: FINAL REPORT ON THE 1993-94 NATIONAL
BLACK POLITICS STUDY (Center for the Study of Race Politics and Culture, University of Chicago
Working Paper No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter NBPS SUMMARY]. The analysis also utilizes data from the
1995 National Opinion Survey of Crime and Justice for a mostly non-black reference group against
which the results from the NBPS sample may be roughly compared. See TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN &
DENNIS R. LONGMIRE, NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, 1995 (Inter-university
1223
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the majority of African Americans believe that the American legal system
treats blacks unfairly. However, compared to their wealthier counterparts,
poor blacks are more likely to view the American legal system as fair.18 In
particular, African American respondents in the lowest income brackets are
twice as likely as those in the highest income brackets to state that the legal
system is fair. 9 This "endorsement" of the American legal system by poor
blacks does not necessarily imply a desire for disparate criminal
enforcement in their communities-still, it is not inconsistent with that
claim. The data also reveal a strong countervailing consideration: Poor
blacks are more inclined to respond that the police behave "like just
another gang." 0 That poor blacks are inclined to view the police as gang-
like, and yet are more likely to believe in the fairness of legal system,
suggests that they may welcome heightened enforcement but not by means
of expanding police discretion. This interpretation of the data is consistent
with the fact that urban minorities are the likely victims of criminal
behavior and police misconduct. Taken together, these findings hint at an
understanding of African Americans' desire for safety and fairness that
balances increased police presence with limited discretion. In particular,
expanded service-oriented patrols and heightened community involvement
are plausibly more consistent with the desires of minorities in high-crime
neighborhoods than a policy of unleashing special tactical units (e.g.,
gangs, guns or drugs) 21 with limited guidance. For example, Herbert
Consortium for Political and Soc. Research No. 6720, Aug. 1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL OPINION
SuRvEY]. For a more detailed description of the surveys, see infra Part IV.A.
18. This result was not found among the non-black sample considered in this work. See infra
Appendix, tbls.1 1-12.
19. There are nine income brackets in the NBPS. See NBPS, supra note 17, at Var. Jl6. This
result is based on the probability of respondents in the lowest two brackets reporting that the legal
system is fair compared to respondents in the highest two of the nine brackets.
20. NBPS, supra note 17, at Var. F24. This finding is supported by a growing literature that
identifies a negative correlation between wealth and favorable perception of the police among blacks.
See, e.g., Komanduri S. Murty, Julian B. Roebuck & Joann D. Smith, The Image of the Police in Black
Atlanta Communities, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 250, 254-55 (1990). "The perception of unethical
police standards appears to be especially widespread among urban residents living in ghettos."
ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 6, at 136 (citations omitted). Recent studies have begun to focus on
the wealth of the neighborhood, rather than the wealth of the respondent, as a means of explaining the
negative association between wealth and perception of the police. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer, Citizens'
Perceptions of Police Misconduct: Race and Neighborhood Context, 16 JUST. Q. 819 (1999) (arguing
the importance of neighborhood class in shaping residents' perception of the police). Other studies
have identified meaningful correlations between a neighborhood's racial or class structure and
perception of the police. See, e.g., Howard Schuman & Barry Gruenberg, Dissatisfaction with City
Services: Is Race an Important Factor?, in PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN URBAN SOCIETY 369-72 (Harlan
Hahn ed., 1972).
21. Such special tactical units include the discredited anti-gang (CRASH) units in the Rampart
Division of the Los Angeles Police Department, the weapons removal team (Street Crimes) unit
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Williams and Anthony Pate discuss several promising community-based
policing mechanisms in their evaluation of various policing strategies in
Newark, New Jersey.22 They found that increased quality of contact
between citizens and police (such as door-to-door police visits in the
neighborhood and other non-confrontational interactions with the
community members) gave the police more opportunities to feel connected
to the communities, learn about their desires, and better serve them.23
"There is ample evidence among the data analyzed to suggest that this
approach had significant, positive effects on the attitudes of residents
exposed to it."'24
To explore further the implications of African Americans' views of
the criminal justice system, arrest rates and reported crime figures were
determined for each respondent's county using the Uniform Crime Reports
(UCR).25 These data suggest that favorable perceptions of the police are
negatively correlated with arrest rates for the low-level offenses of
vandalism and vagrancy. 26 That is, respondents are more likely to view the
police as "gang-like" in communities with higher arrest rates for these
offenses. On the other hand, the data show that favorable perceptions of
the police are positively correlated with arrest rates for more serious
involved in the Amadou Diallo shooting, or the undercover drug unit involved in the Patrick Dorismond
shooting.
22. See Hubert Williams & Antony M. Pate, Returning to First Principles: Reducing the Fear of
Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1987).
23. Instead of arresting loitering youths, Newark implemented a creative solution: "[W]e saw the
pride displayed by officers who solved the apparently disparate problems of loitering youth and a litter-
strewn lot by obtaining financial assistance from local businesses to support a baseball team, and by
having the team members clean up the littered lot on which they would play." Id. at 68. Of course, not
all problems are so happily solved; some problems must be addressed by. traditional crime prevention
methods. However, increased community-police connections may open previously unconsidered and
inexpensive options.
24. Williams & Pate, supra note 22, at 67-68. See also WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND
DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 109-24 (1990)
(discussing the Police Foundation's evaluation of the Newark program).
25. The Uniform Crime Reporting Program provides data on arrests for so-called Part I offenses
(which include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson) and
the Part II offenses of forgery, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism, weapons violations, sex offenses, drug
and alcohol abuse violations, gambling, vagrancy, curfew violations, and runaways. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM DATA [UNITED
STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA, 1996, at 1-4 (Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Soc. Research No. 2389, 2d ed. Sept. 1998).
26. The results from this data are only suggestive because county-level arrest rates and reported
crimes are at best a rough proxy for neighborhood crime and police action. I have sought to refine this
analysis by using crime figures for the respondents' census tracts. See discussion infra Parts IV-V. See
also Richard R.W. Brooks, Correlation Between Arrest Types and Community Perceptions of Legal
Fairness: Implications for Quality of Life Policing (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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offenses, such as violent crimes.27 These findings point to a possible cost
of increased police attention to low-level offenses that promote community
disorganization 28 and invite more serious crimes29 -the so-called order-
maintenance policy.30 Though largely recognized as an effective crime-
fighting tool, this policy has been criticized for intensifying community
conflict with the police. 31 As Wesley Skogan notes, "[e]nthusiasm for
closer police attention is not universally shared."'32 Minorities in urban
neighborhoods are often ambivalent about the police. While needing
protection from crime, many distrust the police and see their order-
maintenance efforts as bullying and fear producing.
How much of an impact should all of these findings have in the debate
on asymmetric criminal enforcement in urban communities? Conspicuous
findings, such as these, tend to carry a misleading amount of weight in
popular debates, as is often the case with glaring, acontextually offered
statistics and emotionally ladened anecdotal accounts. One aim of this
Article is to highlight the need for more research and investigation of an
empirical nature. Ultimately, there are many stories that are consistent with
the data presented here-some more plausible than others. The benefit of
27. Again, this result was not found among the non-black sample considered in this work.
28. For a rich discussion of the forms and extent of community disorder in urban neighborhoods,
see SKOGAN, supra note 24.
29. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 31-32 (discussing the "broken windows" theory of
crime escalation).
30. In a related finding, Cullen et aL observed that residents of disorganized neighborhoods were
less supportive of the police's use of deadly force. They reasoned that "[it is possible that these
neighborhoods are the site of more police surveillance and negative citizen-police interactions, which
may make the residents more suspicious of police power." Cullen et al., "Stop", supra note 15, at 456.
This reasoning is consistent with the findings of Krivo & Peterson, who show that extremely poor
disadvantaged neighborhoods experience qualitatively higher levels of crime. See Lauren J. Krivo &
Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 SOC. FORCES 619
(1986). Higher levels of crime provide more opportunities for police-resident contact and conflict,
which may lead to more negative views of the police.
31. There is evidence of increased police brutality and growing resentment toward such brutality
following the implementation of policies to crack down on disorder in New York City. See Dan M.
Kahan, Privatizing Punishment: Strategies for Private Norm Enforcement in the Inner-City (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See also SKOGAN, supra note 24, at 15 (observing that
"Wilson[] himself has spelled out how efforts by the police to maintain order can become a source of
racial and class discrimination, when the definition of who is 'orderly' lies largely in the hands of the
police.")
32. SKOGAN, supra note 24, at 118. In their evaluation of the Newark programs, Williams &
Pate found that the "'Broken Windows' approach to order maintenance and law enforcement...
appeared to achieve none of its desired goals." Williams & Pate, supra note 22, at 67. It should be
noted that Skogan's discussion of community policing programs in Newark suggests that residents felt
that the police were not "stopping too many people without good reason" or being "too tough on people
they stop." SKOGAN, supra note 24, at 118.
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this type of examination is not simply that it offers answers, but rather that
it informs our questions. No causal claims are made in this analysis; this
analysis highlights significant correlations only. With this qualification in
mind, several important implications can be drawn from the data. First, the
data do not suggest that poor urban blacks are prepared to waive their
constitutional rights in order to reduce crime. Second, the skepticism and
distrust expressed by blacks may signal a more general wave of lack of
faith in the legal system by all citizens. In recent years, for instance,
prosecutors have reported a trend among grand jurors of increasing their
scrutiny of police testimony.33 Understanding the source of distrust and
skepticism among blacks-especially among middle class blacks who are
most distrustful of the legal system-may provide insight into preventing a
crisis of confidence in the police and the legal system. Third, if poor
blacks have more confidence in the legal system than wealthier blacks
have, then prosecutorial efforts to prevent jury nullification by removing
poor blacks may actually increase jury bias. Fourth, by merging crime
figures with attitudinal data regarding police, this work depicts an
important though often dismissed cost of order-maintenance policing.
Community tension with and distrust of police may rise with more
aggressive policing of low-level offenses. Part I presents a brief review of
the literature assessing African American desire for criminal enforcement.
Part II places this work in the broader context of the debate over
differential enforcement in urban minority communities. Part III describes
a simple model of individual willingness to trade away constitutional
protections for increased safety. This model is explored empirically in Part
IV. That part begins with a discussion of the methodology and data used
and closes with a presentation of the results, which are discussed in Part V.
The conclusion offers a brief summary and a discussion of future research
directions.
I. AFRICAN AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF RACIAL INJUSTICE IN
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Public opinion and attitudes on injustice and criminal law enforcement
have been extensively studied. Researchers have sought to identify
significant correlates of public opinions toward the police,
34 the courts,35
33. See David Rohde, Jurors' Trust in Police Erodes in Light of Diallo and Louima, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9. 2000, at B1.
34. See, e.g., Timothy J. Flanagan & Michael S. Vaughn, Public Opinion about Police Abuse of
Force, in POLICE VIOLENCE 113, 128 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996) (exploring public
opinion about the police's use of force).
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various legal sanctions,36 and the legal system.37 Surveys have consistently
found that a nontrivial portion of the general population believes that the
legal system treats minorities unfairly.38  Researchers have also
consistently found significantly greater level of perceived bias in the legal
system among minorities.39 In particular, African American perception of
racial discrimination in criminal law enforcement has been consistently
identified in empirical research and opinion polls.40 To clarify the salient
factors behind this perception, recent studies41 of African American crime
concerns have noted that while blacks are more likely than the general
population to view police brutality and harassment as a problem,42 they are
also much more likely to perceive crime as a serious problem.4 3  Thus
blacks suffer from a "dual frustration"44-being fearful of both the police
and criminals. Additionally, Regina Austin identified cultural ambivalence
when it comes to "black criminal behavior and the debates that it
engenders."45 Tracey Meares also identified a complex set of issues
35. See, e.g., Timothy J. Flanagan, Edmund F. McGarrell & Edward J. Brown, Public
Perceptions of the Criminal Courts: The Role of Demographic and Related Attitudinal Variables, 22 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 66 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A Close
Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ. 116 (1983)
(presenting data on public's view of the death penalty); Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion,
the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIs. L. REV.
171.
37. See, e.g., TOM. R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
38. See, e.g., NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY, supra note 17.
39. See DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE:
CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 42 (1969); ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 6, at 173-75; Ronald
Weitzer, Racial Discrimination in the Criminal Justice System: Findings and Problems in the
Literature, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1996).
40. See John Hagan & Celesta Albonetti, Race, Class, and the Perception of Criminal Justice in
America, 88 AM. J. Soc. 329 (1982); Cormarae R. Mann & William Wilbanks, Racism in the Criminal
Justice System: Two Sides of the Controversy, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS AND ISSJES (Chris W.
Eskridge ed., 2d ed. 1996); Charles W. Peek, George D. Lowe & Jon P. Alston, Race and Attitudes
Towards Local Police: Another Look, 18 J. BLACK STUD. 361, 361 (1981); Steven A. Tuch & Ronald
Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Towards the Police, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642 (1997).
41. See, e.g., KATHERINE MCFATE, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL AND ECON. STUDIES, 1996
NATIONAL OPINION POLL: SOCIAL ATITUDES.
42. See Flanagan & Vaughn, supra note 34; Browning et al., supra note 15; Cullen et al., "Stop",
supra note 15.
43. See DOJ, PERCEPTIONS OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, supra note 2.
44. See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks' Crime Concerns: African Americans Show
Less Confidence in System, Favor Stif Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at All.
45. Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1992). A considerable amount of literature, going back several decades,
has also identified ambivalence among the general public's view of law enforcement. See Flanagan &
Vaughn, supra note 34.
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underlying African American desire for tough criminal enforcement. 4 6
While these works highlight the complexity of assessing African American
attitudes on criminal justice, other research provides insight into
interpreting results. For example, rather than treating the fairness finding
as an "endorsement" of the American legal system by poor blacks, it may
be appropriate to interpret this finding as black middle class
disenchantment with the system. Heightened disenchantment among
better-off blacks has been identified in many institutional settings.47
Evidence of black-middle-class distrust of the legal system has been
documented by scholars for some time.48 The research presented here
extends these works by introducing new theories and data to explain the
phenomenon of black-middle-class disenchantment.
II. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE FOR DIFFERENTIAL
ENFORCEMENT
Lowering standards for arrests and convictions may lower crime rates,
but at what cost? Amy Farmer and Dek Terrell argue that reduced
standards in high-crime neighborhoods and the resulting inequality in arrest
and conviction rates may be optimal for a society that cares about both
controlling crime and assuring fairness!' Farmer and Terrell further claim
that urban minorities who are concerned with crime and victimization
46. Using 1987 General Social Survey (GSS) data, Meares evaluated African American support
for laws that treat drug offenders harshly, and found evidence supportive of "dual frustration" or
ambivalence. See Meares, Lessons, supra note 5, at 156-64.
47. See ELLIS COSE, RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1994); MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE
MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICS (1994); ; NBPS SUMMARY, supra note 17;
JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF
THE NATION (1995); HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN,
RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1997). For further discussion, see
infra Part V.
48. See Hagan & Albonetti, supra note 40; Raymond J. Murphy & James W. Watson, The
Structure of Discontent: Relationship Between Social Structure, Grievance, and Riot Support, in THE
LOS ANGELES RIOTS: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 140 (Nathan Cohen ed., 1970); Peek, et al.,
supra note 40; Walter J. Raine, The Perception of Police Brutality in South Central Los Angeles, in THE
LOSANGELES RIOTS: A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICALSTUDY380 (Nathan Cohen ed., 1970); Ronald Weitzer
& Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class and Perceptions of Discrimination by the Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
494, (1999); Scot Wortley, John Hagan & Ross Macmillan, Just des(s)ert? The Racial Polarization of
Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 31 L.& SOC'Y REV. 637, 649 (1997). For further discussion, see
infra Part V.
49. "Results [of their model] using F.B.I. data indicate an upper bound of inequality where
innocent black Americans are five times more likely to be convicted of a violent crime than innocent
white Americans." Amy Farmer & Dek Terrell, Crime Versus Justice: Is There a Tradeoff? 29 (1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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"might even prefer more inequality in the justice system."5 This claim is
simply a restatement of the urban frustration argument-an argument that
is currently being used to promote heightened sanctions and expanded
police discretion in urban minority communities. Roughly, the argument
maintains that the majority of law-abiding residents in these communities
welcome (or should welcome) disparate enforcement policies even at the
expense of certain civil liberties: Poor high-crime communities are willing
to trade away civil liberties in order to assure the provision of more basic
needs, such as decent housing, fewer gangs and incidents of gang-related
violence, better education for their children, drug-free neighborhoods and
so forth.
Federal drug enforcement policies provide an apposite application of
the argument. Consider the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine
(crack) and powder cocaine, the so-called 100-to-1 rule.51 Under this rule,
someone charged with the offense of possession with intent to distribute 50
grams of crack faces the same mandatory prison sentence as someone
charged with possession with intent to distribute 100 times more powder
cocaine (i.e., 5,000 grams). Since crack distribution is concentrated in
urban communities, the 100-to-1 rule has resulted in higher incarceration
rates and significantly longer prison terms for African American drug law
offenders.52 Thus, some opponents of the rule have labeled it racist-if not
in design, then in implementation. However, Kate Stith has argued that
rather than working against the interest of African Americans, the 100-to-i
rule disproportionately benefits black communities. Stith claims that these
communities benefit from stringent enforcement of crack cocaine laws
because such enforcement removes criminal offenders from the
neighborhood for longer periods of time and provides greater deterrence for
prospective dealers.53 Stith and others argue that poor blacks living in
urban drug-devastated communities should welcome the heightened
enforcement. Proponents of this view, such as Kennedy, further assert that
judges, scholars and casual observers who condemn the consequential race-
based disparity for criminal defendants are missing the big picture: "In
[their] zeal to protect that mainly black pool of persons convicted of crack
50. Id. Farmer & Terrell do acknowledge in a footnote that the opposite also may occur. See id.
at 30 n.17.
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994).
52. See Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV.
L. REv. 1270, 1276 (1998) (citing the U.S. Sentencing Commission and noting that in 1993 blacks
comprised 88.3% of federal crack convictions, while whites comprised only 4.1%. Whites on the other
hand comprised 32% of federal powder cocaine convictions, while blacks made up 27.4%),
53. See Stith, supra note 5, at 153.
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offenses, [they] almost completely ignore[] those, also mainly black, who
must share space on streets and in buildings with crack traffickers."
54
Another application of the urban frustration argument can be found
among the commentaries in favor of the Chicago Housing Authority's
(CHA) former building search policy.55 The search policy, which allowed
for mass searches of public housing units without probable cause, was
reported to have the support of the overwhelming majority of the public
housing residents. Supporters of the policy viewed it as an appropriate and
necessary response to rampant shootings and lawlessness in the housing
projects. To highlight this view, Meares and Kahan note that "in one four-
day period near [the time the policy was put in place], the police recorded
more than 300 gun-fire incidents in the Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway
Gardens projects."56  Thus, when the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) challenged the CHA's building search policy on the grounds that
it violated the constitutional rights of the residents, "an overwhelming
majority of the residents opposed the ACLU's effort to block the building
searches."
57
Residents of urban communities have also resisted efforts to promote
"their" constitutional rights over their desire to establish exclusively black
male public schools.58 Confronted with the failure of current models used
to educate young black males, some proponents of gender- and race-
segregated public schools are willing to trade away the constitutional rights
that many of them fought for decades earlier in order to achieve better
educational results.
Debates over urban youth curfews have also triggered application of
the urban frustration argument. Perhaps the most compelling recent
contribution to the contentious debate over the desirability and
constitutionality of discretionary legal enforcement in high-crime minority
communities involves so-called gang-loitering laws and the use of civil
injunctions to restrict gang members from congregating in public spaces.
59
Consider, for example, Chicago's controversial "Gang Congregation
Ordinance," 60 which allowed the police to disperse any loitering
61 group of
54. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 375.
55. See Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (striking down the
housing authority's building search policy on Fourth Amendment grounds).
56. Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May
1999, at 4, 4.
57. Id.
58. See Margaret A. Burnham, Twice Victimized, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 16.
59. See Livingston, supra note 5.
60. CHICAGO, ILL., MON. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992).
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persons in the presence of a suspected gang member. According to the
Illinois Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Morales, the ordinance gave
the police unconstitutionally broad enforcement discretion. 62  Meares and
Kahan assert that discretionary enforcement should be allowed because the
local community, overwhelmed by gangs and drug-related crimes,
sponsored and broadly supported the ordinance.63 In addition to local
sponsorship and support, Meares and Kahan maintain that the "(courts)
should have upheld the gang-loitering ordinance" because adequate
safeguards were in place,64 and because incentive alignment between the
supporters of the ordinance and those likely to be burdened by it operated
to prevent misuse of discretion.65 They, and others scholars, such as Debra
Livingston,66 distinguish current discretionary law enforcement approaches
from those of the 1960s and 1970s that the U.S. Supreme Court deemed as
failing to meet constitutional standards.67 Meares and Kahan suggest that
courts should respect a (high-crime) community's desire to strike an
appropriate balance between broadened police powers and safety when that
community internalizes the burden of expanded police discretion, 68 and
when the community's interests are sufficiently represented through
political and legal institutions. They cite the increase in African American
political participation and the fact that "African-Americans today make up
a significant percentage of all urban police departments" 69 as evidence that
safeguards were in place to protect against abuse of discretion under the
61. Loitering is defined as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose. See id.
62. 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 1997), aft'd, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
63. See Meares & Kahan, supra note 56, at 8. See also Meares & Kahan, supra note 5, at 197-
213 (maintaining that there continues to be strong community support for the ordinance).
64. Kahan & Meares, supra note 9, at 1183. These safeguards include political accountability to
African Americans in Chicago and increasing numbers of black police officers serving in the Chicago
Police Department. See id.
65. See id. at 1182-83. "Far from being the target of these new law-enforcement strategies,
inner-city minority residents are now their primary sponsors." Id. at 1154. "ITihere is no natural
antagonism between the supporters of community policing and those who bear the coercive incidence
of curfews, anti-loitering laws and the like." Id. at 1168.
66. See Livingston, supra note 5, at 595-627.
67. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (illustrating the void-for-
vagueness doctrine).
68. Kahan & Meares present a very interesting burden internalization test for determining when
courts should defer to identified community standards in evaluating liberty constraining laws:
"[A]ssuming the law is one that affects the average citizen in a meaningful way, she can determine
through introspection whether the norms that fuel the regulated conduct are welcome or unwelcome."
Kahan & Meares, supra note 9, at 1182. However, even if one agrees that the average citizen
sufficiently internalizes the costs of the policy, it is not obvious that she is the appropriate arbiter. Also,
the problem of ascertaining the distribution of community standards in order to identify this average
citizen remains.
69. Id. at 1162.
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ordinance. Supporting this position, Justice Thomas, in his dissenting
opinion in Morales, issued the same criticism to opponents of the gang-
loitering ordinance that Randall Kennedy delivered to opponents of the
100-to-1 rule:
Today, the Court focuses extensively on the "rights" of gang members
and their companions. It can safely do so-the people who will have to
live with the consequences of today's opinion do not live in our
neighborhoods. Rather, the people who will suffer from our lofty
pronouncements are people... who have seen their neighborhoods
literally destroyed by gangs and violence and drugs.
70
To be sure, disparately harsh punishments for crack-cocaine offenses,
discretionary police enforcement of gang ordinances, curfews, and mass
building searches all differ in meaningful ways-there are probably more
differences than similarities among these law enforcement policies.71 Still,
all of these policies have been promoted with the claim that black
communities support expanded enforcement in order to combat the rampant
crime in central city neighborhoods. However, the claim of overwhelming
black support for (and benefit from) differential legal enforcement has been
contested.7 2  For example, Meares and Kahan's claims of strong
community support for Chicago's gang-loitering ordinance have been
challenged by Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer: "The truth is that
the anti-loitering ordinance was intensely controversial .... and that to the
extent one can identify any predominant view, Chicago's anti-loitering
ordinance was opposed by the very groups that Meares and Kahan identify
as its principal supporters."
73
70. Morales, 527 U.S. at 114-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71. Meares & Kahan focus on community involvement and pay deference to community policing
and order-maintenance strategies to support the expanded use of gang-loitering laws, youth curfews and
building searches. See Meares and Kahan Respond, BosToN REv., Apr.-May 1999, at 22, 22-23. "In
many cities where violent crime has declined-including New York and Boston-order-maintenance
policing strategies similar to the ones we are defending deserve at least part of the credit." Id. at 22 n.1
(citation omitted). On the other hand, the 100-to-i rule for crack and powder cocaine was largely
motivated by a "get tough on crime" policy that, according to some of its critics, had predictably
detrimental consequences for the communities in which the laws operated.
72. David Cole has criticized Kennedy for not providing more than anecdotal evidence in
support of his claim. See David Cole, The Paradox Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall
Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction", 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2560-62 (1995). Meares challenged
commentators on both sides of that debate to provide empirical support for their claims. See Meares,
Lessons, supra note 5, at 137.
73. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 12, at 215-16 (1998). Meares and Kahan's claims of
adequate community representation through the political process and in law enforcement agencies have
also been challenged by many other scholars. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Rights & Interests, BOSTON
REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 10; Joel F. Handler, It's Not So Simple, BOSTON Rev., Apr.-May 1999, at 12;
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The remainder of this work focuses on the issue of community support
for differential policies and expanded police discretion to combat gangs
and neighborhood crime. Results from this research may be interpreted as
providing some empirical evidence for the urban frustration argument.
This evidence, however, does not by itself support an expansion of
discretionary and differentially harsh legal enforcement in poor urban
communities. First, it must be noted that a large majority of African
Americans across most surveys tend to view the American criminal justice
system as unfair to African Americans.74 It is among the minority of
respondents,75 who believe that the legal system is fair, where
disproportionately strong support is identified among the poor. Second,
survey data show that poor blacks are more likely to view the police as
gang-like themselves, rather than as an important solution to gang violence.
Taken together, this evidence reveals the difficulty in identifying broad-
based support for differential enforcement in poor urban communities. The
data suggest that there is disproportionate support for, or at least belief in,
legal institutions among poor blacks. However, the data do not support
(even inferentially) the notion that the majority of poor urban blacks
support expanded police powers to reduce gang violence and crime.
76
Furthermore, this work does not maintain that high-crime urban
communities should or should not receive differential enforcement. There
are, arguably, many reasons to support broadened criminal enforcement in
high-crime urban communities. For example, the social harm from under-
enforcement may be greater because crime in these communities affects
more people or because there is more violence associated with it;77 or the
Steiker, supra note 12; Jeremy Waldron, Inalienable Rights, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 18;
Franklin E. Zimring, Mystery Terms, BOSTON REV., Apr.-May 1999, at 17.
74. This claim is well documented in the research literature concerning public opinion polls on
criminal justice over a number of years. See generally Flanagan et al., supra note 35; Peek et al., supra
note 40; Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1797 n.6; Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 48, at 494, 498; Ronald Weitzer
& Steven A. Tuch, The Polls-Trends: Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police, 61 PUB.
OPINION Q. 642 (1997).
75. Typically between 15% and 30% of respondents in most surveys concerning the legal
system. See sources cited supra note 74.
76. Indeed, there is reason to believe that urban blacks wish to restrict, rather than expand, police
discretion. The police assaults on Rodney King, Abner Louima, and Amadou Diallo resonate in the
cultural psyche of Americans generally and African Americans in particular. These accounts, along
with widespread reports of the random police traffic stops for the offense of "Driving While Black" and
accepted folklore of commonplace police abuse of blacks present a high barrier for police officials to
overcome.
77. Stuntz uses a class-based model, rather than a race-based one, to suggest that lower-class
criminal markets "almost certainly cause more social harm" and "tend to be more violent than their
upper-class equivalents." Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1799. See also Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1263-64.
1234 [Vol. 73:1219
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1234 1999-2000
2000] MINORITY PERCEPTIONS OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 1235
police may find enforcement easier in poor urban communities;78 or a long
history of under-enforcement and police neglect might mandate greater
attention to these communities.79 There are also, arguably, many reasons
not to support harsher criminal enforcement in high-crime urban
communities. For example, the criminal justice system may already be too
biased against black criminal defendants to tolerate any more discretion at
their expense;80 or differential enforcement, no matter how sensible or well
intended, might substantially weaken the normative force of our criminal
laws;81 or a more nuanced equal protection doctrine based on effect as well
as purpose is required.82 These competing arguments, in addition to rival
constitutional interpretations, 83 may continue to frame this important
debate. Yet, the argument for expansion of differential enforcement based
on the claim that these "communities" desire such a policy (i.e., the urban
frustration argument) is not supported by the data presented here.
I. MODEL OF INDIVIDUAL'S WILLINGNESS TO TRADE RIGHTS
This section describes a simple model of a community resident's
willingness to trade constitutional protections for aggressive policing.
84
78. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECr-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
105-06 (1995) (noting that arrests are easier in socially disorganized neighborhoods because illegal
activity occurs on the streets rather than indoors, and that undercover narcotics officers find easier
acceptance into these neighborhood due to the social disorganization of the community).
79. Randall Kennedy argues that under-enforcement in the black community has denied blacks
equal treatment under the law. See Randall Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment,
and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1259. See also
Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 420 (1988).
80. Butler calls for black jury nullification for certain non-violent crimes. See Butler, supra note
5, at 677.
81. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1800-01.
82. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1318-19 (1995) (arguing that equal protection ought to weigh against policies leading to racially
disparate effects).
83. Regarding the constitutionality of differential enforcement for crack and powder cocaine, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's ruling that the state's crack cocaine-powder cocaine
sentencing disparity violated the state constitution. See State v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (dismissing claims of racial discrimination in the
selection of federal crack cocaine prosecutions). For discussion of the constitutionality of broad
discretionary enforcement in high-crime urban areas, see supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
Compare People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997), in which the California Supreme
Court determined that an ordinance prohibiting gang members from appearing with other gang
members did not violate First Amendment rights of association nor was it void for vagueness. See
California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act, CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.20
(West 1988).
84. Though much of the previous discussion is couched in terms of communities' desires, this
model uses the individual resident as the basic unit of analysis. No means of aggregating individual
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Assume that more aggressive policing reduces crime and increases the
resident's perceived and actual level of safety, the first commodity of
interest. Assume further that more aggressive policing requires that the
resident sacrifice some portion of her bundle of constitutional protections
and rights, the second commodity of interest.85 Let U(r, s) represent the
resident's utility from rights (r) and safety (s).16 Figure 1 depicts an
indifference curve for this resident, U. At the point A, the resident enjoys
a high level of safety, Y, and the current level of constitutional protections
and rights, r.
preferences to form community preferences are presented, since such a discussion is well beyond the
scope of this work. This limitation is a greater problem for the urban frustration argument than for the
model. That is, there is a tremendous difference between what an individual chooses and what a
neighborhood chooses-just as there is a tremendous difference between what a neighborhood chooses
and what a nation chooses. For a commentary on the implication of this choice for the urban frustration
argument, see Dershowitz, supra note 73. Regardless of how individual preferences are aggregated, the
model will show that there is no a priori justification to believe that residents in high-crime
neighborhoods are more willing than those in low-crime neighborhoods to sacrifice individual liberties
to bring about a reduction in crime.
85. These are simplifying assumptions made only to motivate the discussion. One can certainly
imagine more aggressive policing leading to a decreased sense of safety. It is also possible that
aggressive policing need not interfere with citizens' rights, at least over some range.
86. The standard assumptions of convexity, monotonicity, completeness, and transitivity are
taken as granted.
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The slope of U at the point A captures the individual's marginal
willingness to trade fights for safety. Now consider the individual's
preferences at a lower level of safety, Y , and the same level of rights. This
bundle is represented by the point B in Figure 2.
1237
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1237 1999-2000







The claim that a resident in a high-crime area is more willing to
sacrifice constitutional protections can be interpreted as a higher marginal
willingness to trade rights for safety at point B than at point A. However,
the two parallel lines in Figure 3 (one tangent to UA at A and the other
tangent to U at B) graphically show that the marginal willingness to trade
at B need not be greater than at A.87
87. While (quasilinear) preferences of this sort may be a theoretical curiosity, it is reasonable to
imagine that altruism or distaste for police discretion and abuse may lead law-abiding residents to prefer
more constitutional protections as the crime rate increases. Thus the marginal willingness to trade
rights for safety may fall, stay the same, or rise when moving to point B from point A.
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Of course, individuals make choices based on prices as well as
preferences. Introducing differential prices for assuring rights and
providing safety in high-crime and low-crime communities may lead the
resident to make very different choices. Indeed, the price of aggressive
policing may be lower in a poor high-crime community8 8 or the price of
assuring rights may be greater in these communities.8 9 Under these
circumstances, the resident may choose a weaker bundle of rights for
increased safety. However, as discussed in Part II above, arguments in
favor of expanded enforcement in high-crime neighborhoods based on
price and cost considerations are not the same as arguments in favor of
increased enforcement based on preferences and marginal willingness to
substitute rights for safety. Whether residents in high-crime communities
have a greater willingness to trade away certain rights to assure their safety
is an empirical question-not a theoretical one. Unfortunately, these are
communities for which there has traditionally been little data. When
included in surveys, their numbers are often too few to make reliable
88. See TONRY, supra note 78, at 105-06.
89. William Stuntz observes that crimes in poor, high-crime neighborhoods are likely to be more
violent and generate greater social costs. See Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1796. Therefore, assuring
individual rights at the expense of retaining this greater social cost implies a higher price for assurance
of constitutional protections compared to the price of such assurances in communities with less crime.
1239
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 1999-2000
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
statistical inferences. Using what data are available, the following parts
seek to explore the relationship between African American preferences to
feel safe from crime and their willingness to expand police discretion
thereby limiting their individual rights. It should be acknowledged at this
point that the data do not allow direct investigation of minority stated
preferences to trade rights for safety. The data and analysis merely provide
a window into these preferences by looking at trends among responses to
questions about the legal system and the police. The results that follow do
not settle the empirical question, they only lay out some important
considerations and suggest certain plausible interpretations.
IV. METHODOLOGY & RESULTS
This part first describes the data and presents basic summary statistics.
After discussing sources of potential bias, the results of the empirical
model are presented. A probit model is used to estimate the likelihood and
statistical significance of respondents stating that "the American legal
system treats everyone fairly," based on income, other demographic
indicators, and county-level arrest rates.90 The marginal effects from the
probit models are presented. Similar models are used to evaluate
respondents' views of the police.
A. THE DATA
This analysis is primarily based on survey responses taken from the
1993-94 National Black Politics Study (NBPS).9' The sample of the
NBPS was obtained from a probability sample of all black households in
the United States. Two sub-samples of equal size were created in order to
assure representation of the general population. The first sub-sample was
generated using random-digit dialing, while the second sub-sample focused
on Census tracts with 30% or more black residents. "The demographic
differences between the two sub-samples are negligible-in almost every
respect they appear identical."92 The response rate was 65%. Telephone
interviews of approximately forty-five minutes in length were completed
for 1206 respondents. The two main areas of interest pursued in the survey
were black political and religious ideologies. The respondents also
90. Though only probit results are presented in the paper, the data were also evaluated using logit
and linear probability models. Unsurprisingly, the results are consistent (with respect to direction,
magnitude and significance) across all three models.
91. The study was administered through the University of Chicago, with principal investigators
Michael Dawson, Ronald Brown, and James S. Jackson. See NBPS, supra note 17.
92. See NBPS SUMMARY, supra note 17, at 10.
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provided information on gender, race, class, and various other demographic
indicators. There are two questions of principal focus in this study. The
first asked the respondents to choose which one of the following two
statements most accurately reflects their opinion:
Generally the American legal system treats all groups fairly; OR
The American legal system is unfair to blacks.
The second question asked respondents to decide which of the
following two statements most accurately reflects their opinion:
The police are an important part of stopping gang violence; OR
The police are too much like just another gang to stop gang violence.
Table 1. Income Distribution and Urbanization of Respondents
Obs. Family Income Obs. Location Code
152 Less than $10,000 96 Rural 0.00
126 $10,000-$15,000 89 Small town 0.25
139 $15,000-$20,000 167 Small city 0.50
123 $20,000-$25,000 177 Suburb 0.75




66 More than $75,000
93 Missing 4 Missing
1113 Total valid cases 1202 Total valid cases
The NBPS was expanded to include county-level per capita arrest
rates and reported crimes for each respondent using the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program (UCR), which provides data on arrests for Part I
offenses-i.e., murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny,
auto theft, and arson-and Part II offenses-i.e., forgery, fraud,
embezzlement, vandalism, weapons violations, sex offenses, drug and
alcohol abuse violations, gambling, vagrancy, curfew violations, and
runaways.
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Table 2. Table of Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 1136 42.8 16.1 18 88
Income 1113 0.46 0.31 0 1
Education 1199 12.94 3.24 0 26
Urbanization 1202 0.76 0.33 0 1
% black in
census tract 1183 73% 30% 0% 100%
Female 781
Male 425
The analysis utilizes data from the 1995 National Opinion Survey of
Crime and Justice (C&J95) in order to provide a non-black reference group
against which the results from the NBPS sample may be roughly compared.
The C&J95 is a random-sampled national survey of 1,005 adults in the
continental United States, focusing on crime and the legal system.93 As
with most surveys employing a random-sampling design of the general
population, the number of African Americans in the sample is quite small
(i.e., 77 or 7.6% of the total).94 The analysis results of C&J95 are
presented in the Appendix.
B. THE BASIC REGRESSION MODEL
The basic regression equations use the perception of the Legal System
as Unfair and The Police as Gang-like as dependent variables and a subset
of the following Right Hand Side (RHS) terms:
ax + p I Age + p 2 Urbanization + t3 Income + t34 Education +
Pl5 Gender + 3 6 Pblack + t37 Professional + 3 8 Information-Networks +
P 9 Crime + 8,
where a is a constant and e is the error term. The first six independent
variables are fairly straightforward and are described in Table 2 (Pblack
represents the estimated percentage of the respondent's census tract that
was black in 1991). Children is a dichotomous variable equal to one if
there are children under age eighteen living in the respondent's household
93. See NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY, supra note 17.
94. See id., PART 2: NATIONAL DATA. The response rate was 65%. Interviews were conducted
by telephone. For more information on this survey see id.
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and zero otherwise; likewise, Professional is equal to one if the respondent
described her main occupation as professional or technical and zero
otherwise. Information-Networks is a composite of responses concerning
the respondents' connection to various black media, such as black
newspapers, magazines, television, and radio programs. The variable
Crime represents county-level per capita arrests and reported crimes for
various offenses.
C. ISSUES OF BIAS
Justice Thurgood Marshall observed that "[w]hile a public opinion
poll obviously is of some assistance in indicating public acceptance or
rejection of a specific penalty, its utility cannot be very great."95 The
utility of the opinion polls used in this study ought to be appraised
critically. The most critical issue is the generalizability of the responses
and results from the NBPS or any given opinion poll of this kind: (1) Are
the respondents representative of the population? (2) Did respondents and
the survey designers share the same understanding of the survey questions?
(3) Assuming that the respondents are representative and that there existed
a shared understanding of the notions of "fairness" and "legal system," how
much ought we trust attitudes that vary across surveys and change over
time?
Surveys are uncertain instruments. The methodology for generating a
sample for the survey may create significant bias in the results of the
survey. As mentioned previously, the NBPS sample was in part
determined randomly and in part based on neighborhoods with high
African American concentration. No significant differences between the
two parts were identified, suggesting that the sampling methodology did
not generate a biased sample. 96  Even when the sample is fairly
representative of the general population, bias may arise from interpretive
miscues of the interviewers, the respondents or both.97 For example,
significant bias has been shown to occur when the race of the interviewer
and the race of the respondent do not match.98 In order to minimize
interviewer bias and elicit more open responses, the interviewers who
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
96. The nature of the interview, however, probably introduced some bias. That is, the sample
represents African Americans with telephones, where at least one adult in the household was home and
willing to go through a 45-minute interview.
97. See L. M. Sanders, What is Whiteness? Race-of-Interviewer Effects When All the Inter-
viewers Are Black (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
98. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 87-90.
1243
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1243 1999-2000
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
administered the NBPS survey were all African American. Still, the
problem of respondent interpretive bias is always present. It is impossible
to know with certainty what the respondent is responding to in a survey.
1. Response bias: "the legal system"
For African Americans (if not the whole country) the two most
observed legal battles of the early 1990s were the Rodney King police
brutality case and the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial. The timing of the
NBPS survey was post-Rodney King and pre-O.J. Simpson. This fact may
have meaning for the interpretation of the term "the legal system." Parties
could interpret "the legal system" as law enforcement by the police or
judicial enforcement in the courts or some combination of the two.99 The
court cases involving Rodney King brought new popular attention to the
American judiciary, but it was the Rodney King videotape which captured
and focused worldwide attention on American police enforcement in urban
areas. Therefore, it is a reasonable concern that the respondents may have
been more inclined to interpret "the legal system" as police enforcement.
One might attempt to deal with this interpretive bias by considering the
correlation between viewing the police as like another gang and viewing
the legal system as unfair. Table 3 shows the cross tabulation between this
"police gang-like" question and the question about the fairness of the legal
system.
While these responses are highly correlated, some disaggregation of
the meaning of "legal system" may still be reached. As can be seen in
Table 3, nearly half of the respondents felt that the police were part of the
solution, whereas 83% felt the legal system is unfair to blacks. Thirty-five
percent of those respondents who stated that the legal system is fair also
stated that the police behaved like a gang. These respondents may
reasonably be assumed to be referring to the court system when stating that
the legal system is fair.
99. Of course, "the legal system" could further include legislators, the executive branch, and
regulation through administrative agencies. However, this work considers police enforcement and
judicial enforcement practically exhaustive.
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Table 3. Simple Cross-tabulation of Respondents' View of
Legal System & Police
Police Police
Like Gang Imp. Solution Total
Legal system fair 64 118 182
(35%) (65%) (17%)
Legal system unfair 470 358 828
(57%) (43%) (83%)
Total 534 476 1010
(53%) (47%) (100%)
2. Response bias: "fairness"
Political scientists and legal scholars have long argued that the
perception of unequal treatment is the single most important source of
dissatisfaction with the American legal system. °00 Empirical research on
fairness of the legal system supports the notion that Americans generally
agree on notions of fairness and criminal justice. 10 Specifically, Tom
Tyler has persuasively argued that when it comes to evaluating the fairness
of the legal system, Americans focus on procedures rather than on
outcomes. 0 2 Tyler also found "no evidence that different types of people
think differently about the meaning of procedural fairness."'1 3 That is,
differences in age, gender, race, income, and education did not generate
differences in how the individuals in Tyler's study understood fairness.
Thus, although we cannot be certain that the respondents and the survey
administrators share the same notions of fairness, Tyler's work provides
100. See Austin Sarat Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11
L. & SOC'Y REV. 427 (1977).
101. See MICHAEL R. GoTrSREDsON & TRAVIS HIRsCH!, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME (1990);
Sally Engle Merry, Everyday Understandings of the Law in Working-Class America, 13 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 253, 253 (1986); Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Is There a "Common Law" of
Responsibility?, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 277, 294 (1987).
102. See TYLER, supra note 37, at 107-08. Tyler argues that (i) consensus on fairness in a
pluralistic society is more easily formed on procedure than on outcomes and (ii) bounded rationality
prohibits the use of outcomes as a measure of fairness. This focus on procedural fairness may help
explain why better-off blacks, who have achieved "good outcomes," are less likely to say that the
American legal system is fair compared to poor blacks, whose outcomes are less successful. If better-
off blacks perceive more unequal treatment, they will continue to view the American legal system as
unfair regardless of any individual gains that are made. For an elaboration of this point, see infra Part
V.
103. TYLER, supra note 37, at 142.
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convincing theoretical and empirical evidence to indicate that they do.
There is one caveat, however, to the claim that respondents had the same
idea of fairness. Tyler observes that individuals may have different
procedural fairness requirements for the police and the courts. 104  As
previously discussed, some respondents may have perceived "the legal
system" as courts, while others perceive "the legal system" as the police, or
some combination of the courts and police. Given this potential difference
in the understanding of "the legal system" (and differing procedural
fairness requirements for the courts and the police) the parties may have
understood fairness differently as well.
D. RESULTS
The principal result here is that higher-income blacks are more likely
than poor blacks to perceive the legal system as unfair to blacks. Table 4
shows the distribution by family income categories of NBPS respondents
who perceive the legal system as fair to all groups. The declining
percentages in the third column of this table reveal a clear negative
association between family income and perception of fairness in the legal
system. That is, respondents in higher-income categories tend to view the
legal system as more biased against blacks. Using this baseline association
as a point of departure, the correlation between perceptions of fairness in
the legal system and family income is estimated by controlling for a host of
socio-demographic variables. In addition to Family Income in nine
categories, other respondents' characteristics controlled for include Age (in
years), Urbanization,105 Gender (coded zero-one, where female is one),
Education (measured as highest year of education), 10 6 Professional (a
proxy for occupational prestige coded zero-one, where one represents more
prestige), and Information Networks (a continuous measure from zero to
one of connectedness to various black media). Neighborhood char-
acteristics, such as the percentage of the neighborhood that is black
(Pblack) and county-level arrest rates for various offenses are also
104. See id. at 104.
105. Urbanization is controlled for in five categories and is scaled from zero (rural) to one (large
city).
106. Five separate measures of education were considered in this analysis: 1) those with and
without high school degrees (including GEDs); 2) those with and without some college education; 3)
those with and without a college degree; 4) education level in eight categories from zero years of formal
education to college-educated; and finally 5) highest year of formal education, which is reported. All of
the education measures lead to qualitatively the same results in terms of the sign of the coefficient,
statistical significance, and effect on the other covariates.
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controlled. Estimates for these covariates were generated using a probit
model.
Table 4. Respondents' Perception of Fairness in
Legal System by Income
No. of View Legal
Family Income Obs. System as Fair








More than $75,000 61 11.5%
Table 5 shows the probit marginal effects for the dependent variable
of viewing the American legal system as unfair. In Models 1, 2, and 3 the
Age coefficient is small and negative, though significant. Thus, all else
being equal, reducing the respondent's age will slightly increase the
probability of that person believing that the legal system is unfair to blacks.
1247
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247 1999-2000
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW











































Standard Errors in Parentheses
Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
a. Probit marginal effects where the dependent variable is equal to one if respondent
stated that legal system is unfair to blacks and zero otherwise-missing cases not
included.
b. Derivatives of probit coefficients evaluated at the means. Due to rounding,
significance levels may appear to differ from actual significance, as reflected by
asterisks.
c. Defined as murder, rape, robberies, and aggravated assaults. The crime figures are
based on county-level arrests per capita. The marginal effects represent the change in the
probability (from the mean) of stating that the legal system is unfair to blacks given an
increase of one standard deviation of the choice variable.
d. Arrests for sale or manufacturing of marijuana, synthetic narcotics, cocaine, opium
(and derivatives morphine, heroin, and codeine) as well as other dangerous non-narcotic
drugs.
On the other hand, the Family Income coefficient is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level. To characterize this relationship
roughly, one might say that moving up one income bracket increases the
likelihood that a respondent will view the legal system as unfair by
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approximately 1.5% to 2%. 107 Two percent is a nontrivial increase given
the little room left for growth when starting from about an 80% likelihood
of viewing the legal system as unfair. That is, the maximum possible
increase is approximately 20%, and moving up one income bracket
produces 7.5% to 10% of the maximum possible change. The Professional
coefficient (in Models 2 and 3) is also positive and statistically significant.
Thus, controlling for various demographic indices, respondents with
professional employment and higher incomes are significantly more likely
to view the legal system as unfair. 08 This significant relationship does not
hold in the non-black sample of the C&J95. 09
Table 6 shows the marginal effects for the dependent variable of
viewing the police as gang-like. In Model 1, the Age and Family Income
coefficients are negative and significant. That is, younger respondents are
more likely to view the police as gang-like than are poor respondents. In
Models 2 and 3, the Age and Family Income are again statistically
significant-in addition to Information Networks. The Information
Networks variable has a positive coefficient, suggesting that respondents
who identified themselves as having a strong connection to various black
media are more likely to view the police as gang-like. Observe that in
Model 3, the Violent Crimes coefficient is negative and significant,
implying that higher arrest rates for violent offenses are associated with
more favorable views of the police. 0 On the other hand, the coefficients
for the Vagrancy and Vandalism variables are positive and significant.
That is, higher arrest rates for these offenses are significantly correlated
with more negative views of the police.
107. The marginals for the family income coefficient were calculated at the mean, as well as lower
and higher values. The 0.012 value reflects the calculation at the mean. The effect is stronger for
movements from lower income brackets. That is, going up one bracket from a lower income bracket
increases the likelihood of the respondent viewing the legal system as unfair more than going up one
bracket from a higher income bracket.
108. An alternative model might look at the relationship between socio-economic status (SES) and
belief that the legal system is unfair. Sociologists frequently use weighted measures of income,
education and professional status to determine SES. Using SES (as opposed to individual regressors for
income, education, and professional status) generally produces more powerful results because of
collinearity among the regressors. Since significance was found for two of the three regressors in the
same model, one can infer even more confidence in their significance.
109. See infra Appendix, tbls.11-12. For this non-black sample Age and Education were
statistically significant correlates with the perception that the courts are biased against minorities and
that the police are unfair, younger and more educated respondents tended to view the courts and police
unfavorably.
110. The same is true for Total Reported Crimes (not shown).
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Standard Errors in Parentheses
Significant at 10% level
Significant at 5% level
"" Significant at 1% level
a. Probit marginal effects where the dependent variable is equal to one if respondent
stated that police are like just another gang and zero if respondent stated that police are
an important part of stopping gang violence.
b. Derivatives of probit coefficients evaluated at the means. Due to rounding,
significance levels may appear to differ from actual significance, as reflected by
asterisks.
c. Defined as murder, rape, robberies, and aggravated assaults. The figures are based
on county-level arrests per capita. The marginal effects represent the change in the
probability (from the mean) of stating that the police are gang-like given an increase of
one standard deviation of the choice variable.
d. Arrests for the sale or manufacture of marijuana, synthetic narcotics, cocaine, opium
(and derivatives morphine, heroin, codeine) as well as other dangerous non-narcotic
drugs.
Comparing the results from Tables 5 and 6, it is interesting to note that
better-off blacks are more distrustful of the legal system, while poorer
blacks are more distrustful of the police. These results are highly
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consistent with a host of empirical studies in this area and will be further
addressed in the following part.
At this point, however, Table 7 provides some insight into the matter
by presenting a cross-tabulation of the police question and the legal system
question in two broad family income categories, namely those with family
incomes at or below the range of $25,000 to $30,000 and those above this
range.111 The first row of the table indicates that conditional on viewing
the legal system as fair to all groups, respondents in the higher income
categories are very likely to view the police as an important part of the
solution to gang violence (i.e., 76% important solution to 24% gang-like.)
Respondents in the lower income categories were more evenly split on their
views of the police conditional on viewing the legal system as fair to all
groups (i.e., 60% important solution to 40% gang-like).
Table 7. Respondents' View of Legal System & Police in
Two Income Categories
Income $25,000-$30,000 Income > $25,000-$30,000
View the Police As: View the Police As:
View of Like Important Like Important
Legal Sys. Gang Solution Gang Solution
Fair 40% 60% 24% 76%
Unfair 61% 39% 52% 48%
On the other hand, conditional on viewing the legal system as unfair,
variance in differences between respondents in the higher income
categories (i.e., 48% important solution to 52% gang-like) and respondents
in the lower income categories (i.e., 39% important solution to 61% gang-
like) is substantially smaller. Wealthier blacks who view the legal system
as fair are much more likely to hold consistently positive views of the
police as well. l l2
I 11. The bracket of $25,000 to $30,000 was selected because it is the median family income
bracket for the sample.
112. Perhaps because richer blacks live in safer neighborhoods and witness less police-citizen
conflict, their view of the legal system is less likely to inform their confidence in the ability of the
police to stop gang violence.
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By reversing Table 7 we can gain further insight into the association
between the legal system and police questions. Table 8 also presents the
police question and the legal system question in two broad family income
categories. However, now the perception of the police is represented in the
rows, and responses to legal system question are captured in the columns.
The first row of this table indicates that conditional on viewing the police
an important solution to gang violence, 73% of poorer blacks state that the
legal system is unfair compared to 27% who state that the legal system is
fair. For wealthier blacks, the figures are 79% and 21%, respectively. The
second row of figures shows that conditional on viewing the police as
gang-like, 86% of poorer blacks view the legal system as unfair and 14%
view it as fair. Ninety-three percent of wealthier blacks view the legal
system as unfair (conditional on believing that the police are too much like
another gang) while only 7% view it as fair. So poorer respondents who
view the police as gang-like are twice as likely to view the legal system as
fair (14% versus 7%). It may be that poorer respondents view the legal
system (perhaps the courts) as a recourse to the "gang-like" police.
Counting on the legal system to correct dishonest street-level enforcement,
poor African Americans may simultaneously be more favorable in their
assessment of the legal system while more disparaging of the police. On
the other hand, better-off blacks-perhaps possessing more knowledge
about the legal system generally and less about police behavior in poor
urban neighborhoods-may be marginally more inclined to maintain the
opposite views.
Table 8. Respondents' View of the Police & Legal System in
Two Income Categories
Income < $25,000-$30,000 Income > $25,000-$30,000
View the Legal System As: View the Legal System As:
View of Unfair Fair Unfair Fair
Police
Important
Solution 73% 27% 79% 21%
Gang-Like 86% 14% 93% 7%
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V. DISCUSSION OF DATA
In Rage of a Privileged Class, Ellis Cose presents a narrative
description of a phenomenon broadly supported by more quantitative
sources: the black middle and upper-middle class (who, by almost all
accounts, have made tremendous gains under the American economic,
legal, and political system) express greater discontent about "the system"
than do poor blacks, who increasingly find themselves more impoverished,
less represented, and less protected from crime.113 Numerous analyses of
survey data point to the same conclusion. Hochschild observes that well-
off blacks are more likely than poor blacks to agree that "American society
is racist" and are less likely to believe in the "American Dream."
114
Michael Dawson finds that affluent blacks are more likely than poor blacks
to view the economic condition of blacks as "much worse than whites.""
5
Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Kryson note that "it is middle-class blacks who
express the most impatience with the pace of civil rights activity."
116 With
respect to perceptions of criminal injustice, Hagan and Albonetti find that
blacks in professional positions are more likely to believe that the
American legal system is unfair to blacks. 117 Wortley, Hagan, and
Macmillan find a similar result for well-educated blacks in Canada.
118
Finally, Weitzer and Tuch have recently reported that better-educated
blacks are more critical of the criminal justice system.1 9 This catalogue of
black-middle-class discontent directs attention to the question of why
better-off blacks express more dissatisfaction with the legal system. 120 The
113. See COSE, supra note 47, at 1-9.
114. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 47, at 73. Hochschild indicates that not only are these findings
consistent across surveys, they are largely consistent over the last twenty years. See id at 80-81.
115. See DAWSON, supra note 47. For a general discussion of surveyed African American
discontent, see NBPS SuMMNARY, supra note 17.
116. SCHUMANET AL., supra note 47, at271.
117. See Hagan & Albonetti, supra note 40, at 352. This finding has been observed by other
researchers as well. See Murphy & Watson, supra note 48; Peek et al., supra note 40; Raine, supra
note 48.
118. See Wortley et al., supra note 48.
119. See Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 48.
120. Heightened middle class perception of ethnic discrimination has also been identified among
other ethnic groups. A study of 500 respondents from six ethnic groups (Irish, Jews, blacks, Cubans,
Dominicans and Puerto Ricans) in New York City found that "[almong all groups, it is the middle-class
respondents that tend to perceive ethnic bias in city government and their groups as the victims of this
bias." Robert C. Smith, Sources of Urban Ethnic Politics: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations, 5
RES. RACE & ETHNIC REL. 159, 183 (1993). While higher-income minorities perceive more bias, there
is no strong indication that high-income whites share the same perception. For example, Hagan &
Albonetti found that higher SES whites were not more likely to perceive criminal injustice. See Hagan
& Albonetti, supra note 40, at 351-52. The data analyzed in this Article also show that higher-income
white respondents were not inclined to express a perception of racial or ethnic bias in the legal system.
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discussion below addresses this question by presenting several possible
explanations under two broad categories: differences in perception and
differences in treatment and experiences.
A. DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTION
Individuals witnessing the same event often reach different
conclusions or focus on different aspects of the event. This phenomenon
may underlie the observed differences between the better-off and the poor
respondents in this study. The source of this phenomenon might be
understood as being driven by relative deprivation, heightened sensitivity
or both.
1. Relative deprivation
A century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that successful
Americans are "restless in the midst of abundance."'' This observation
may aptly be made about successful African Americans today, and perhaps
the cause of the discontent is the same. Tocqueville conjectured that
professional access promotes discontent:
When all the privileges of birth and fortune are abolished, when all
professions are accessible to all .... [a man] will readily persuade
himself that he is born to no vulgar destinies.
... [M]en easily attain a certain equality of conditions [but] they can
never attain the equality they desire.
... [This causes] that strange melancholy which oftentimes will haunt
[them] in the midst of their abundance .... 122
Hochschild advances a notably similar conjecture to explain the
present discontent among successful blacks: "[O]nce the formal barriers of
racial discrimination are mostly dismantled[,] then one is tempted to
anticipate more and more success, even if less and less
reasonably.... [People] run the risk of becoming more dissatisfied as they
Education, however, is an important mitigating factor. That is, more educated whites, controlling for
income, were more inclined to perceive racial bias in the court system. See id. at 351. See also infra
Appendix, tbl.12.
121. ALEXs DE TOCQUrVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 145 (Arlington House 1966) (1835)
("At first sight there is something surprising in this strange unrest of so many happy men .... The
spectacle itself, however, is as old as the world... .
122. Id. at 146-47.
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become more successful. ' 12 3 That is, because of their history of success,
middle class and upper class blacks maintain higher expectations both of
themselves and their environment than do poor blacks. 124 Additionally,
well-off blacks expect more class privilege. Given these high expectations,
better-off blacks experience greater levels of personal disappointment when
the legal, economic or political system fails to support their expectations.
Sociologists refer to this phenomenon as relative deprivation-i.e.,
successful blacks perceive their individual outcomes adversely relative to
their high personal expectations. 125 Ellis Cose frequently encountered this
phenomenon in his survey of the black professional class:
"Here I am, a black man who has done all the things I was supposed to
do," he said and proceeded to tick off precisely what he had done: gone
to Harvard, labored for years to make his mark in an elite law firm,
married a highly motivated woman who herself had an advanced degree
and a lucrative career. He and his wife were in the process of raising
three exemplary children.... Yet he was far from fulfilled.
126
Runciman provides a useful dichotomy in the theory of relative
deprivation: egoistical (or personal) deprivation and fraternal (or group)
deprivation. Personal relative deprivation refers to the perception that
one's outcome is viewed negatively compared to one's reference group.
127
When one's reference group as a whole is perceived as deprived compared
to other groups, that phenomenon is referred to as group relative
deprivation. 2 8  This dichotomy helps to explain why better-off and poor
blacks differ in their assessment of the legal system. First, low-income
African Americans may be more inclined to restrict their frame of reference
to their immediate community when evaluating their outcomes. Their
restricted frame results from having fewer reference groups against which
to compare their outcomes. Therefore, poor blacks in homogeneous
123. HoCdSCHLD, supra note 47, at 102.
124. See id. at 102-05. The author presents this argument and cites survey and experimental data
to support the claim. See id DeCarofel's analysis provides a useful explanation of this apparent
paradox. Namely, improvement in one's situation leads to rising expectations and more relative
deprivation when bad outcomes are realized. See Andre deCarufel, Factors Affecting the Evaluation of
Improvement: The Role of Normative Standards and Allocator Resources, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 847, 856-57.
125. See W.G. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF
ATITrUDES TO SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTImH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1966); James A. Davis, A
Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation, 22 SOCIOMETRY 280 (1959).
126. COSE, supra note 47, at 49 (quoting interviewee).
127. See RUNCIMAN, supra note 125, at 34,50.
128. See James M. Olson & J. Douglas Hazlewood, Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison:
An Integrative Perspective, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON 1, 4-6 (James M.
Olson et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter RELATrVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON].
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communities may be more likely to focus on personal relative deprivation
with a narrowly defined reference group of other blacks in their
community. Scholars have highlighted this point in discussing why poor
people appear more tolerant of injustice.
129
Middle-class blacks, however, are more focused on group relative
deprivation. Scholars speculate that better-off blacks are more concerned
about the status of blacks compared to other groups as opposed to
maintaining a strictly black reference group. As middle-class African
Americans achieve more success at home, in schools, and in the workplace,
situations involving a strictly black reference group become less available.
These successful blacks develop multiple reference groups, which allow
them to compare more easily their outcomes to whites and other racial
groups. Thus, despite achieving good individual outcomes, they continue
to feel deprived as long as blacks as a whole fare poorly.
130
2. Heightened sensitivity
In addition to a greater propensity to make make adverse assessments
based on comparisons to similarly situated whites, successful blacks may
be more sensitive to race-based differential treatment due to environmental
factors. This sensitivity might develop from discrimination and other
negative experiences in integrated workplace settings. For example, Erik
Wright observed that income discrimination may be greatest among the
black professional-managerial class.'31 Using this observation, Hagan and
Albonetti speculate that the members of this class "who perceive income
discrimination may be sensitive to the perception of injustice elsewhere as
well.' 132 African Americans in integrated (or mostly white) residential or
workplace settings may have more occasions to observe racial bias. Such
experiences place middle-class and upper-class blacks in a constant state of
129. See Joanne Martin, The Tolerance of Injustice, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON, supra note 128, at 217, 217-21. For related discussion, see Judith M. Blau & Peter M.
Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 114 (1982)
and the follow-up study by Steven F. Messner, Economic Discrimination and Societal Homicide Rates:
Further Evidence on the Cost of Inequality, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 597 (1989) that discusses the role played
by relative deprivation and economic inequality in one's tolerance for crime and violence.
130. For a discussion of this point and the role it plays in collective action among the black middle
class, see Ronald P. Abeles, Relative Deprivation, Rising Expectations and Black Militancy, 32 J. Soc.
IssuEs 119,120 (1976).
131. See Erik Olin Wright, Race, Class and Income Inequality, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1368, 1387-88
(1978).
132. Hagan & Albonetti, supra note 40, at 352.
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alert with respect to differential treatment.133 Often this bias is not obvious
to casual observers. Scholars and lay commentators have noted that race-
based differential treatment is often quite subtle-petty indignities or the
so-called micro-inequities-but not unobservable to blacks attuned to it.134
On the other hand, poor African Americans living and working in
racially homogeneous environments may view the American legal system
as harsh, but believe it is that way for everyone. In this sense the narrow
frame of reference of their immediate neighborhood isn't chosen by the
individuals, so much as it is determined by their experiences. One might
thus conclude that blacks living in high-minority-concentrated central city
neighborhoods are less able to identify racial bias given their
environmental constraints. Nancy Apple and David O'Brien, however,
provide evidence indicating a significant negative correlation between the
concentration of blacks in a neighborhood and black individuals' attitudes
toward the police.135  In other words, as the number of blacks in a
neighborhood increases, blacks in that neighborhood are less likely to view
the police favorably.' 36 Apple and O'Brien speculate that increasing the
number of blacks in a neighborhood allows for more opportunities "for
blacks to associate with others who have negative attitudes toward the
police, [resulting] in an overall increase in the negative sentiment toward
the police."'137 Of course, police behavior itself may be affected by
increased concentration of blacks in a given neighborhood-or at least
affected by factors correlated with increased black concentration in a
neighborhood. That is, the police may behave less well when the number
of blacks in a neighborhood increases. This issue notwithstanding, the
findings of Apple and O'Brien are not entirely inconsistent with the
heightened-sensitivity model, since the respondents in their study
commented on the "quality of police protection" and not necessarily racial
bias by the police or the legal system generally. Apple and O'Brien may
have captured the sentiment that the police are tough or unfair to all
individuals in the neighborhood. Indeed, as the concentration of blacks in
the neighborhood increases, there are fewer opportunities to witness
133. Routine traffic stops of blacks driving in established neighborhoods, where white drivers
pass unobstructed, provide an illustration of this mechanism.
134. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 47, at 114-17; Mark Whitaker, White & Black Lies,
NEWvsvEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 52, 54.
135. See Nancy Apple & David J. O'Brien, Neighborhood Racial Composition and Residents'
Evaluation of Police Perfornance, 11 J. POLiCE SCI. & ADMIN. 76, 83 (1983).
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differential treatment to others. Therefore blacks in high-concentration




While the section above focused on differences in perceptions of
racial bias in the legal system between better-off and poor blacks, the
discussion now turns to actual differences in the treatment that these two
groups receive. A separate discussion of actual differences is not intended
to suggest that it is mutually exclusive of differences in perceptions of
racial bias. In fact, there is every reason to expect that these phenomena
are inextricably connected.
1. Linked-fate/dire-fate
The "linked-fate/dire-fate" argument maintains that better-off blacks
bear the costs of racially biased legal enforcement in urban areas, but
experience none of the benefits. Experiencing few or no benefits from
differentially harsh enforcement, better-off blacks may be more willing to
critique the American legal system as unfair. This argument begins with
the observation that well-off, more-educated blacks tend to exhibit greater
race consciousness than other groups 39 and are likely to maintain a
connection and sense of responsibility to urban black culture.
140
138. It is important to note that this argument is not based on the often-cited but infrequently
supported "subculture of violence" hypothesis. See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG & FRANCO FERRACUTI,
THE SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY IN CRIMINOLOGY (1967). This
hypothesis maintains that individuals in highly violent environments learn to accept violence as a part
of life. This hypothesis has been used to suggest that blacks in high-crime neighborhoods are more
tolerant of violence from other citizens and possibly from the police. However, numerous studies
indicate that blacks in poor high-crime neighborhoods are much more likely to report a perception of
police mistreatment, suggesting that they are not entirely complacent with the level of police violence.
It may be that these blacks are accustomed to observing violence, but the overall perception of police
mistreatment is still too strong to be dismissed. Additionally, the black subculture of violence
hypothesis has been challenged by studies showing that whites are more likely to approve of violence.
See Liqun Cao, Anthony Adams & Vickie J. Jensen, A Test of the Black Subculture of Violence Thesis:
A Research Note, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 367,373 (1997).
139. See MARY R. JACKMAN & ROBERT W. JACKMAN, CLASS AWARENESS IN TlHE UNITED
STATES (1983). But cf. Richard L. Allen, Michael C. Dawson & Ronald E. Brown, A Schema-Based
Approach to Modeling an African-American Racial Belief System, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV., 421,435-36
(1989); Clifford L. Broman, Harold W. Neighbors & James S. Jackson, Racial Group Identification
Among Black Adults, 67 SOc. FORCES 146 (1988); David H. Demo & Michael Hughes, Socialization
andRacial Identity Among Black Americans, 53 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 364 (1990).
140. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Hold-outs & Holymen in Bronzeville: Race, Religion and
Development on Chicago's South Side 5 (June 1, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Additionally, better-off blacks have a strong sense that their fate is linked
to the black community. 141 Furthermore, some studies suggest that ethnic
groups are more aligned in their view of criminal justice than class
groups.142 Thus the views of injustice held by the black middle and upper
classes may be largely informed by the perceived experiences of poor
blacks in "the black community." 143 However, since middle- and upper-
class blacks do not live in neighborhoods where they face the same dire
fate as poor urban blacks, they do not directly appreciate the benefit of
reduced crime rates due to racially uneven, perhaps unfair law enforcement
policies. 44 Therefore, these African Americans may maintain a more
negative view of criminal enforcement and American justice. On the other
hand, since harsh policies directed at black criminal defendants may reduce
crime in their neighborhoods, poor urban blacks tend to discount any
procedural unfairness when evaluating tough criminal enforcement.
Therefore, this group of African Americans may maintain a more positive
view of the American legal system. This claim is supported by the study of
Robert Boeckmann and Tom Tyler, which found that "instrumental fears
about the dangers that people pose" were a primary factor underlying
willingness to deny procedural protections to potential law breakers.
145
Other cognitive research has highlighted instances where perceptions of
injustice collide with pragmatic self-serving choices. Daryl Bem found that
individuals in these instances may adjust their notions of justice, "rather
than live with stressful inconsistency between their beliefs and their
behaviors." 146  Finally, William Julius Wilson's thesis concerning the
141. See DAWSON, supra note 47, at 81-84. One might ask why middle- and upper-class blacks
view their fate as linked with black criminal defendants and not with black victims of crime. A possible
answer to this question may be found in the earlier discussion of group-versus-personal relative
deprivation. That is, better-off blacks, being more focused on how blacks are faring relative to whites,
are more troubled by the disparate arrests and imprisonment of black criminal defendants through
largely white institutions. While black-on-black crime is troubling for well-off blacks to deal with, they
may view it as a less pressing in-group problem.
142. See, e.g., BAYLEY & MENDELSOHN, supra note 39, at 126. Cf. Weitzer, supra note 20, at
843 (suggesing that class-based differences are more salient that race in the present context).
143. "Special populations [e.g., middle-class blacks] may have greater knowledge of others [i.e.,
poor blacks] and rely more on others' experiences when evaluating their own." TYLER, supra note 37,
at 153.
144. Better-off blacks also avoid some costs of racially biased legal enforcement in urban
neighborhoods--such as wrongful stops, searches, and so forth--since they do not live in these high-
crime communities.
145. Robert J. Boeckmann & Tom R. Tyler, Commonsense Justice and Inclusion Within the
Moral Community: Why Do People Receive Procedural Protection from Others?, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 362,377 (1997).
146. Martin, supra note 129, at 239 (citing DARYL J. BEM, BELIEFS, ATrrfUDES, AND HUMAN
AFFAIRS, BASIC CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGY SERIES (Edward L. Walker ed., 1970)).
1259
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1259 1999-2000
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
declining significance of race for poor African Americans also supports the
claim: Concerns about poverty, crime, and social disorder have superseded
matters of race for poor blacks. 47 Thus, fairness to black criminal
defendants becomes a second-order consideration.
2. Expressive alignment
Better-off blacks may be more likely to condemn the legal system as
racist in order to maintain their commitment to the broader black
community and their own self-image. Successful blacks who have moved
out of poor, mostly black neighborhoods may voice lack of confidence in
the legal system's treatment of blacks as a means of expressing their
continued connection with the old neighborhood. These well-to-do, well
educated blacks may ignore hard-to-swallow facts, such as the level of
black-on-black crime and community devastation by gangs, in order to
express their alignment with the poor black community (and especially
those members of the community who are perceived as victims of the white
dominant culture) and against the economic, legal, and political
establishment.
Ellsworth and Ross, as well as Sarat and Vidmar, provide evidence
indicating that individuals often discount countervailing facts (which they
themselves state are important) when reaching decisions about the fairness
of legal rules. 14 8  Ellsworth and Ross label this behavior "irrational
consistency" in beliefs and documented it in the context of opinions
concerning the death penalty. 149 When respondents in these studies were
confronted with evidence that directly contradicted arguments they used to
support their beliefs concerning capital punishment, the respondents stated
that new evidence (even if factual) would not alter their death penalty
views. This led Ellsworth and Ross to conclude that these views do not
reflect informed, reasoned consideration of facts, but rather an
"undifferentiated, emotional reflection of one's ideological self-image."' 150
Donald Kinder and David Sears provide a similar argument in the context
of suburban racism, noting that beliefs appear to be expressive or symbolic
rather than instrumental. 151 Also, Cullen, Frank, and Langworthy, in their
147. See WILLiAM JLuus WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS (1978).
148. See Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 36; Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 36.
149. Ellsworth & Ross, supra note 36, at 162.
150. Id. at 116.
151. See Donald R. Kinder & David 0. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus
Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 414, 422 (1981). In this sense,
irrational consistency in beliefs may be motivated by subconscious impulses, deep-rooted coping
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empirical study of the perception of the police's use of deadly force, found
that the views of African Americans on the topic were less a distinctive set
of attitudes than a reflection "of a more global liberal crime ideology."
152
3. Differential bias
It is widely known that blacks are arrested and imprisoned at rates that
are significantly disproportionate to their numbers in the general
population. Recent studies show that racial bias does not account for much
of this disproportionality at the formal stages of arrest, conviction and
sentencing in criminal enforcement. 153 However, these studies have not
been able to dismiss claims of bias as a principal force in less formal
enforcement decisions, such as the decision to stop black motorists.
154
Stories of black judges, lawyers, professors, doctors, and other
professionals being stopped, detained, and sometimes wrongfully arrested
are well reported in the popular press. Popular press coverage and
acknowledgment of the practice of stopping black motorists who happened
to be driving an expensive car or driving in an expensive neighborhood (or
who appeared to be otherwise out-of-place) was so broad that the term
"driving while black" quickly became common parlance. If members of
the black middle and upper classes enter and exit the criminal justice
system at this stage-replete with racial bias-then one might argue that
they experience more discrimination than poor blacks, who either
participate in the more formal stages of the criminal justice system or who
seldom venture out of their neighborhoods or "place." Consider Ronald
Weitzer's survey of African Americans' and whites' perceptions of
misconduct. He found that, in some respects, middle-class blacks share
more common experiences and views of the police with middle-class
whites than they do with poor blacks.'55 For example, the middle-class
mechanisms, or subsurface ideological constraints, rather than by conscious self-seeking desires, such
as ignoring important facts because doing so serves instrumental ends. See generally Daryl J. Bern,
Introduction to Beliefs, Attitudes, and Ideologies 8, 14 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
152. Cullen etal., "Stop", supra note 15, at 458.
153. See discussion infra Part IV.C.l.
154. Cf. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Theory and Evidence (Oct. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Knowles et aL
examined the traffic-search patterns of the state police in Maryland, where African Americans represent
only 18% percent of all motorists on Interstate 95 in Maryland, but 63% of the motorists who were
searched by state police. See id. at 1. They suggest that stops by state police are consistent with non-
prejudiced drug interdiction. See id. at 4-5. "In other words, it is possible to explain the black-white
disparities observed in the Maryland motorist search data without recourse to racial prejudice." l at 4.
It should be noted that their results are also consistent with racial prejudice by the police.
155. See Weitzer, supra note 20, at 840.
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blacks, in his study, reported experiencing little police suspicion and
mistreatment in their own neighborhoods. However, outside of their
middle-class black community, they experienced greater levels of suspicion
and mistreatment.1 56  Weitzer argues that greater mobility among the
middle class in conjunction with being African American makes better-off
blacks more vulnerable to stops outside their neighborhoods.
157
Of course, opportunities for informal legal discrimination against
blacks in poor communities exist, and poor African Americans do venture
out of their neighborhoods, too.158 However, it may be that better-off
blacks are more susceptible to discretionary bias because they have more
opportunities to "appear out of place." The contention that better-off
blacks experience more racial bias than do poor blacks is an empirical
issue. If this contention is true, even in part, then it could explain why
wealthier African Americans have less faith in the American legal system.
C. IMPLICATION FOR DIFFERENTIAL ENFORCEMENT &
EXPANDED DISCRETION
An evaluation of the competing motivations behind the "fairness"
finding reveals the difficulty of using it as a warrant to expand differential
enforcement in black urban communities. On the one hand, if poor blacks
are more supportive of the American legal system because they are less
aware of the existence of race-based unfairness (i.e., the relative
deprivation and heightened-sensitivity hypotheses), then a desire or
willingness on their part to expand legal enforcement in poor urban
communities is not a fully informed position for lawmakers to follow. This
was Justice Marshall's principal contention in denying the general utility of
public opinion polls in these matters. 159 He felt that respondents are often
not "fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities"
when replying to pollsters about the fairness or justness of laws and the
legal system. 160  Marshall's contention is strongly supported by a large
number of empirical studies based (paradoxically) on opinion polls. These
studies identify a high level of ignorance and uncertainty in the general
population concerning legal rules and rights. This uncertainty has been
156. See id. at 832.
157. See id. at 833.
158. In fact, Part V.C.1 infra argues that there is a potential for substantial levels of bias in the
policing of low-level offenses in poor urban neighborhoods.
159. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
-160. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 361 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
was referring to the death penalty.
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shown to be more prominent among African Americans and other
minorities. 161 On the other hand, if poor blacks are more supportive of the
American legal system due to potential personal gains at the expense of
black criminal defendants (i.e., the linked-fate/dire-fate hypothesis), then
an initial expansion of differential legal enforcement may (in a cost-benefit
framework) be justifiable if the gains outweigh the costs. Such cost-benefit
calculations must, of course, be constrained by relevant constitutional
issues concerning the majority of any group seeking to constrain the rights
of a minority.162 Furthermore, even if such constitutional constraints can
be satisfied, these calculations are often beyond the scope of surveys in
general, and are certainly beyond the surveys used in this study. Indeed, if
the calculation could be made for some point in time, dynamic interactions
may reverse the gains-costs result. That is, as Tyler observes, more
important than punishments and rewards, a legal system requires
legitimacy to motivate compliance; in order to maintain legitimacy, a
general sense of procedural fairness is necessary. 163 Thus, despite some
initial benefits accruing to certain individuals in the community, if a
sufficient mass of people in poor urban communities perceive differentially
harsh enforcement as procedurally unfair, then the possibility exists that
compliance with legal rules may actually decrease as punishments get
tougher. Lawless activity in urban communities might increase with
increases in discretionary enforcement and differentially harsh rules.
We must also not be too quick to promote the perceptions of well-off
blacks to the exclusion of poor blacks. Rather than being better-informed
than poor African Americans, wealthier blacks may have different
motivations and incentives when evaluating the legal system (i.e., the
fraternal deprivation and linked-fate/dire-fate arguments). Additionally, as
Stuntz argues, limiting police powers by constitutional regulation of
criminal enforcement may increase the number of poor defendants who are
brought into the criminal justice system as the costs of prosecuting
wealthier defendants increase. 164  Since increased constitutional con-
straints on criminal enforcement have the potential to transfer costs to the
poor, better-off African Americans may not fully appreciate these costs in
161. For a review of the significant empirical literature on this matter and discussing the extent of
public ignorance concerning the severity of legal penalties, see ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 6, at
44-47.
162. For a discussion of this point in the context of black communities choosing to weaken civil
liberties so as to apprehend more criminals, see Dershowitz, supra note 73.
163. See TYLER, supra note 37, at 166. See also Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1800-01.
164. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALELJ. 1 (1997).
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their assessment of the legal system. 165 Finally, better-off blacks may have
a distorted or heightened sensitivity to racial bias or simply experience a
different reality in terms of legal discrimination than do poor blacks.
166
Of central importance is not whether the views of richer or poorer
blacks should carry more or less weight in the debates of criminal
enforcement. The principal reason for evaluating the seeming black-
middle-class discontentment is the implication such an evaluation might
have for our understanding of the American legal system. On the one hand,
better-off blacks may be an isolated minority with very particular and
idiosyncratic views of the legal system. On the other hand, however, their
experiences and perceptions may foretell what lies ahead not just for blacks
generally, but for all Americans. There is budding evidence of broad
skepticism of the police and the legal system from many quarters of
American society. If this trend continues and becomes more widespread
before we fully understand it, then lack of confidence in criminal justice
procedures might wreak havoc on our system's laws and legal enforcement.
Examining the disenchantment among middle-class blacks may very well
increase our general understandings of how the American legal system is
perceived and how we might repair this clouded perception.
1. Broken windows & order-maintenance policing
James Wilson and George Kelling observed in their article Broken
Windows that neighborhood disorder seeds an environment that promotes
serious crimes.167 This observation led to the now broadly held conclusion
that the police and communities can prevent serious crimes from
overtaking a neighborhood by limiting and controlling the appearance of
disorder. Most scholars, including Wilson and Kelling, advocate responses
to limit disorder that involve the police and the community working
together. 168 These responses fall under the general rubric of community
policing and, when properly implemented, they have been credited with
controlling crime. 169 However, in many central city neighborhoods, the
police and the community are often at odds over the police's order-
165. Better-off blacks may not fully appreciate the benefits of expanded criminal enforcement as
discussed in relations to the linked-fate/dire-fate argument.
166. In his study of three Washington, D.C. neighborhoods, Weitzer found that middle class
blacks experienced more police suspicion and mistreatment outside their neighborhoods. Poor blacks
faced less of this type of police suspicion because they were less mobile and therefore less likely to
venture outside their neighborhoods. See Weitzer, supra note 20, at 843.
167. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 29, at 31-32.
168. See id. at 36.
169. See SKOGAN, supra note 24; Livingston, supra note 5, at 578-91.
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maintenance strategies. Complaints that the police are too aggressive and
are often biased against urban minorities are rapidly growing in the wake of
the highly publicized police corruption in cities like Los Angeles, New
York, and Philadelphia.
Accusations of racial bias have long plagued the American criminal
justice system. 170 Critics often point to the highly disproportionate number
of African Americans caught up in the criminal justice system as prima
facie evidence of discrimination. However, the claim that racial bias is
responsible for the disparity in African American arrests and imprisonment
has been challenged by a wave of broad-based empirical studies over the
past two decades. 171 These studies statistically show that racial bias does
not account for the majority of the disparity in arrests, convictions and
sentencing patterns for serious offenses such as homicide and aggravated
assault.172 The studies, however, have been less successful in discounting
claims of bias for drug infractions and other low-level offenses. 173 Indeed,
one might expect more bias in the policing of lower-level offenses because
the associated recordkeeping and review in the processing of these offenses
is substantially less formal-when review exists at all-than with respect
to more serious offenses. Consider, for example, the research of George
Bridges and Sara Steen for an illustration of the subtle, though important,
influence that race plays in the administration of juvenile sentencing.
174
Bridges and Steen studied juvenile offenders and evaluations of these
offenders written by their probation officers. These written evaluations
play a significant role at the sentencing stage. Their study revealed no
direct significant difference in sentence recommendations by race.
175
However, there were pronounced differences in the manner in which the
probation officers evaluated white and black juvenile offenders. In writing
assessments for sentencing recommendations, officers frequently attached
more negative interpretations to the behaviors of black youths compared to
whites. Probation officers often stressed white offenders' social
environment (external characteristics) while blacks were attributed with
negative personality traits (internal characteristics). Sociologists have
170. See TONRY, supra note 78, at 38-39; Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The
Legacy of Racial Hegemony in Anti-gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249,2259-61 (1998).
171. For a survey of some of the more influential studies, see RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 26-46
and TONRY, supra note 78, at 55-80.
172. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, On the Racial Disproportionality of Unites States' Prison
Populations, 73 J. CRmi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1259, 1270 (1982).
173. See TONRY, supra note 78, at 81-123.
174. See George S. Bridges & Sam Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 554,567 (1998).
175. See id.
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long argued that offenders whose behaviors are attributable to external
characteristics are usually viewed as less culpable than those thought to be
motivated by negative personality traits. Furthermore, "youths whose
crimes are attributed to negative personality traits are much more likely to
be perceived as having a high risk of reoffending .... -176 Probation
officers were found to be much more likely to recommend longer sentences
for youths whose crimes they attributed to negative personality traits. 17
7
More generally, criminologist Katheryn Russell points out that police
stops, "which constitute an informal stage, determine in large measure who
will be arrested .... [T]hese encounters, which are not subject to official
measure, must be included in an assessment of whether the justice system
operates in a racially biased manner." 178  Often the behavior is not
consciously or overtly biased and therefore escapes scrutiny, particularly in
the less formal lower stages of the criminal justice system. 179 "In arrests
for less-serious, non-Index crimes, there is ample reason to believe the
police role may well be more proactive than reactive, resulting in the
overarrest of African Americans compared to whites."180 For instance, the
Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York recently
concluded that black and Hispanic males in New York City were subject to
unfair practices through police "stop and frisk" operations.' Similarly,
176. Id.
177. In a related observational study, Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar found that the police used a
significant amount of discretion in their interactions with juvenile delinquents, where a principal factor
guiding this discretion appeared to be the youths' demeanor. They concluded that higher arrest rates for
blacks was not due to higher rates of offending or direct police bias-but rather "due to the fact that
Negroes more often than Caucasians exhibited those aspects of demeanor associated by officers with
'true' delinquent boys." Irving Piliavin & Scott Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 AM. J.
Soc. 206,206 (1964).
178. RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 32-33.
179. Racial bias may still pervade more formal settings. For example, African Americans
consistently receive harsher sanctions in controlled mock trials where only the race of the defendants is
variable. See Neil A. Rector, R. Michael Bagby & R. Nicholson, The Effect of Prejudice and Judicial
Ambiguity on Defendant Guilt Ratings, 135 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 651, 658 (1993); Laura T. Sweeny &
Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies,
10 BEHAVIORAL. SCI. & L., 179, 192-93 (1992). Additionally, racial disparities in sentencing among
mock juries increase when the defendants are accused of crimes often associated with blacks (such as
robbery) as opposed to crimes typically associated with whites (such as embezzlement). See Randall A.
Gordon, Thomas A. Bindrim, Michael L. McNicholas & Teresa L. Walden, Perceptions of Blue-Collar
and White-Collar Crime: The Effect of Defendant Race on Simulated Juror Decisions, 128 J. SoC.
PSYCHOL. 191, 192 (1988).
180. Anthony R. Harris & James A. W. Shaw, Looking for Patterns: Race, Class, and Crime, in
CRIMINOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY HANDBOOK 129, 135 (Joseph F. Sheley ed., 3d ed. 1999).
181. Officials stated that racial disparities in stops exist and, furthermore, that these disparities do
not go away when race-specific crime rates are taken into account. See "STOP AND FRISK", supra note
8, at 121.
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the U.S. Customs Office recently reported that black women airline
travelers were nine times as likely to be subject to invasive searches by
Customs officers-despite the fact that black women's rate of offending
was actually lower than that of white women. 182 Such police practices
would likely have an impact on the perceptions of fairness in the legal
system. That is, focusing on less scrutinized or lower-level offenses in a
community may actually increase racial bias in criminal enforcement. This
interpretation is consistent with the crime data presented above in Part IV.
That part attempts to provide evidence connecting perceptions of fairness
with police practices by merging survey data on African American's views
of the criminal justice system with arrest rates and reported crime figures.
These data suggest that favorable perceptions of the police are negatively
correlated with arrest rates for low-level offenses of vandalism and
vagrancy, and positively correlated with arrest rates for violent crimes.
183
One might infer that minority communities tend to lose confidence in
police fairness as order-maintenance policies become more stringent. If
this inference is correct, then such community sentiment may ultimately
limit the effectiveness of police in confronting more serious and low-level
crimes.
These results are highly suggestive, but not entirely persuasive. The
principal problem is that crime-related activities in a county probably
reflect "hot pockets" of crime in various specific neighborhoods, rather
than being uniformly distributed across the country. Therefore matching
county-level crime data with individual respondents can create significant
identification problems. The county-level figures do not sufficiently
distinguish the neighborhood crime patterns in order to make claims that
are more than suggestive. Unfortunately, there is no centralized source
from which to gather neighborhood crime and arrest figures. In an on-
going research project, the author is seeking to compile neighborhood (i.e.
182. The report summarizes an investigation of U.S. Customs' policies and procedures involving
searches of airline passengers at four airports (John Fitzgerald Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in
New York, O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), and
Miami International Airport) in 1997 and 1998. The report found that black women (U.S. citizens)
were nine times more likely than white women to be subjected to invasive searches, though "[w]ere less
than half as likely to be found carrying contraband as white women who were U.S. citizens." U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/GGD-00-38, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE: BETTER TARGETING OF
AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS 10 (2000).
183. Residents may believe that the police are needlessly (and perhaps harshly) focusing on
vagrants and teenage vandals while more serious offenders continue to devastate their communities. Or
it may simply be that increased contact with law enforcement officers as they attempt to police low-
level offenders engenders a perception of the bias. Whether the bias is merely perceived or actual, the
data point to a real concern with respect to order-maintenance policing.
1267
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1267 1999-2000
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
census-tract-level) crime and arrest figures to merge with the attitudinal
data in the NBPS sample.1
8 4
2. Jury nullification
"First, I ask 'Is American criminal justice just?" 185 Paul Butler posed
this intendedly rhetorical question in urging black jurors to presumptively
acquit African American defendants they believe are guilty of certain
nonviolent crimes, 186  a proposal commonly referred to as jury
nullification. 187 To support his argument in favor of jury nullification,
Butler presents a long list of statistics showing that disproportionate
numbers of African Americans are arrested, prosecuted, convicted and
imprisoned. These oft-cited statistics have lent considerable weight to the
commonly held view (particularly in the black community) that the legal
system is not fair to blacks. Given this broad-based perception of racial
bias in the American criminal justice system, many commentators and
prosecutors have expressed concern that black jurors will heed Butler's call
and not convict guilty defendants. In response to this concern, prosecutors
have sought to identify and remove these jurors either for cause or through
peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges allow prosecutors and
defense attorneys to eliminate a specified number of prospective jurors
without having to demonstrate a cause to the court. 188  However, the
desirability of this strategy of elimination is predicated on the attorneys'
ability to identify impartial jurors. Stuart Brown 89  has formally
184. See Richard R.W. Brooks, Correlation Between Arrest Types and Community Perceptions of
Legal Fairness: Implications for Quality of Life Policing (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
185. Paul D. Butler, Race-based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 911,
922 (1997).
186. Butler first presented the question in 1995, sparking the debate about race-based jury
nullification. See Butler, supra note 5.
187. Jurors have the power to nullify the law by choosing not to convict parties the jurors
conclude are guilty; in turn, these parties are protected from later prosecution by way of the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
188. These challenges are not without some restrictions. For example, attorneys cannot remove
jurors based solely on race, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or on gender, see J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Thus when the court's attention is called to patterns in
peremptory challenges that appear race- or gender-based, it can then demand a race- or gender-neutral
justification. However, there are significant practical difficulties involved in invalidating a peremptory
challenge based on race or gender. Attorneys need only present some justification other than race or
gender to defeat a challenge under Batson or J.E.B. The barriers are so low, in fact, that it is commonly
felt that there continues to be substantial noncompliance with these rulings. See Kennedy, supra note 5,
at 208-30.
189. See Stuart Brown, Peremptory Challenges and Jury Bias: the Social Welfare Effects of a Jury
Selection Institution 12-13, 21 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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demonstrated that if prosecutors wrongly eliminate jurors, they will tend to
make juries less representative 190 and more biased. Paradoxically, the
prosecution strategy may increase racial bias when poor urban African
Americans are removed from jury pools based on a belief that these
African American are more likely to nullify. The analysis of this work
indicates that poor blacks are more likely than better-off blacks to believe
in the fairness of the American legal system. Therefore, poor African
Americans may be more impartial than wealthier blacks, who tend to be
less content with the American legal system and presumably more likely to
nullify. Of course, as a legal and a practical matter, an individual's belief
that the legal system is unfair does not preclude her from faithfully serving
on a jury and convicting defendants whom she concludes are guilty. Jurors
who feel that a law is unfair may still serve on juries if they are willing to
set aside that belief in deference to the law.191 However, one's inclination
to view the legal system as unfair may be viewed as a reasonable proxy for
willingness to nullify, while one's inclination to view the law as fair would
tend to undermine a belief that such a person will nullify.
3. Urbanicity, neighborhood crime, and black conservatism
Since urban blacks are most likely to be the victims of crime, the
urban frustration argument implies that they are more likely to view the
legal system as fair compared to nonurban respondents. However, Table 9
shows little location-based difference in the perceived fairness of the
American legal system. Chi-squared tests for differences in perception
based on urbanization were nonsignificant. Nonsignificance was also
found for the cross tabulation of urbanization and the question concerning
whether the police are gang-like.
Future research should focus on learning more about the effects that
neighborhood crime rates and arrest patterns have on perceptions of the
police and the legal system. The crime and arrests reports used in this
study are based on county-level data. While it is encouraging that
significant results were obtained here, more detailed crime information
(e.g., data at census tract or block level) would strengthen the results and
refine our understanding of perceived fairness and justice in the American
legal system.
190. While the Supreme Court has held that "[d]efendants are not entitled to a jury of any
particular composition," Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 (1990), it has consistently expressed the
value of representativejuries. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87.
191. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986).
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Table 9. Perception of Fairness of the Legal System by
Urban and Non-urban Respondents
Fair Unfair Total Number
Large City 18% 82% 614
Suburb 15% 85% 159
Small City 18% 82% 160
Small Town 18% 82% 82
Rural or Country Area 17% 83% 84
Future research should also focus on understanding black
conservatism and its relation to income and issues of fairness. Regression
results confirm that self-identified black conservatives are more likely to
believe that the legal system is fair. Furthermore, recall the result from
Table 7 that indicates wealthier blacks who view the legal system as fair
are much more likely to hold positive views of the police than poorer
blacks who view the system as fair.
This result may possibly reflect black conservatism among the middle
and upper classes-a possibility that should be explored. However, the
notion that black conservatism is a phenomenon among the black middle
and upper classes is not supported here, as demonstrated in Table 10. The
connections between political self-ideology and perceptions of fairness in
the legal system is worthy of further investigation.
Table 10. Cross-tabulation of Income and Conservatism
Less Conservative More Conservative
$30,000 or Less 56% 44%
$30,000 or More 55% 45%
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CONCLUSION
The claim that blacks in urban communities desire differentially tough
legal enforcement and greater police discretion to combat rampant crime is
not obvious. While it is true that blacks in these communities perceive
crime as a significant problem, they also view police brutality and
harassment as a nontrivial concern. Therefore, identifying African
American desire for differential and discretionary enforcement is a difficult
task-but a task that, nonetheless, must be undertaken before advancing
claims based on such a desire. To shed some light on the desire of the
"black community" for differential and discretionary legal penalties, this
research used survey data on African Americans' perceptions of the legal
system. Most of the results in this work confirm commonly held views,
such as the belief that younger respondents tend to find the legal system
unfair to African Americans, while respondents who characterize
themselves as conservative tend to find the legal system fair to all groups.
However, the finding that African American perception of fairness is
inversely related to income is somewhat unexpected. That is, one might
predict that African Americans who have achieved greater material success
in American society would view the legal system as more fair than those
who experience greater poverty, crime, and social disorder. Just the
opposite was found, i.e., poor blacks are more likely to view the American
legal system as fair. One might infer that poor blacks view the legal system
as fair despite (or perhaps because of) the differentially tough legal
enforcement in their communities. This inference is consistent with the
argument that poor African Americans desire disproportionately tough
legal enforcement in their communities. However, data also indicate that
poor blacks have little confidence in the police. Poor blacks are more
inclined to report that the police behave too much like a gang to be an
effective response to gang-related crimes. In the context of the urban
frustration argument, these findings suggest that aggressive enforcement
with limited police discretion may be consistent with high-crime black
communities' desire for safety and fairness. On the other hand, one may
question whether it is sufficient that individuals in these communities
"choose" (from a truncated set of alternatives) to have harsher penalties.
That is, the basis of these choices must be considered when informing legal
policy. The analysis of black perceptions of fairness presented in this work
does not lend strong support for the policy of differential enforcement
based on the claim that these "communities" desire such a policy.
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APPENDIX-REGRESSION MODELS OF NON-BLACK SAMPLE
Table 11. Factors Correlated with Belief that the Police are Unfaira





































































Number of Observations 778 707 756
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Significant at 5% level
Significant at 1% level
a. Probit marginal effects where the dependent variable is equal to one if respondent rated "the
fairness of the police in dealing with people" as "low" or "very low" and zero for "high," "very high"
or "average." NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY, supra, note 17.
b. Equal to one if the respondent stated that the courts deal "too harshly" with criminals and equal to
zero otherwise.
c. A measure of perceived police aggressiveness, which is equal to one if the respondent stated that
it is a "serious problem" or "somewhat a problem" that the police use excessive force in the
respondent's community, and equal to zero otherwise.
d. A measure of various neighborhood concerns, which is equal to one if the respondent stated that
it is a "serious problem" or "somewhat a problem" in the respondent's neighborhood, and equal to
zero otherwise.
1272 [Vol. 73:1219
HeinOnline -- 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1272 1999-2000
2000] MINORITY PERCEPTIONS OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT





















































































Number of Observations 710 660 660
Standard Errors in Parentheses
Significant at 5% level
Significant at I% level
a. Probit marginal effects where the dependent variable is equal to one if respondent stated that it is
a "serious problem" or "somewhat a problem" that courts "do not treat minorities as well as they treat
whites"; the dependent variable is equal to zero if the respondent indicated that it is a "minor
problem" or "not a problem" NATIONAL OPINION SURVEY, supra, note 17.
b. Equal to one if the respondent stated that the courts deal "too harshly" with criminals and equal to
zero otherwise.
c. A measure of perceived police aggressiveness, which is equal to one if the respondent stated that
it is a "serious problem" or "somewhat a problem" that the police use excessive force in the
respondent's community, and equal to zero otherwise.
d. A measure of various neighborhood concerns, which is equal to one if the respondent stated that
it is a "serious problem" or "somewhat a problem" in the respondent's neighborhood, and equal to
zero otherwise.
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